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- ABSTRACT -
In this study it is attempted to estimate the amount of speculation in foreign exchange 
markets. Such an estimate is bard to make because it is theoretically as well as empirically 
difficult to delintitate specuJation in relation to other activities. In particular, the distinction 
between speculation and hedging is highly problematic. Notwithstanding these difficulties it 
is shown how the composition of gross flows can be used to derive information about 
speculation and hedging. 
In an extensive analysis of the interconnections of various fx market activities it is 
shown that hedging may generate large sbort-term capital flows which cannot be easily 
distinguished from speculation. The size of these flows does not only depend on capital and 
trade flows but also on net and gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. 
Based on these findings, an analysis of capital flows between Spain and the rest of the 
world sbows that a larger part than earlier believed of the capital outflows dnring the EMS 
crisis may have been due to bedging. The second case study which focuses on Japan reveals 
remarkable changes in the behaviour of Japanese and/or foreign investors. 
What are the implications for econontic policy? The study highlights the significance 
of stocks of open fx positions of foreigners and residents. If ihese stocks have been 
accumu1ating over many years, any crisis of confidence may trigger large outflows due to 
bedging, the size of which may by far be more important than the potential amount of speculation. Such hedging activities would hardly be deterred by a Tobin-tax or similar 
devices. 
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1. Speculation in the foreign exchange market: the problem dermed 
The recent EMS crisis has highlighted the significance of capital movements for 
exchange rates and even entire exchange rate systems. lbis demonstration of the power 
of market forces was reinforced by the BIS report on international foreign exchange 
markets, which was published in spring 1993 (BIS (1993», while speculation was still 
boiling. lbis report presented evidence as to the enormous size of the foreign exchange 
market and underlined the general impression that central banks are more or less 
helpless against speculative runs. Turnover of US$ 880 bn. on a normal day, indeed, 
seem irresistable when compared to the volume of international trade or official 
reselVes. 
However, the question remains whether the bulk of transactions in the foreign 
exchange market is really due to speculation. The answer to this question presupposes 
a definition of foreign exchange speCUlation. In a very broad sense, every activity 
involving open fx positions can be considered "speculative". However, exposure to 
exchange rate risk would be too wide a defiIiition of exchange rate speCUlation. Keeping 
an open fx position is not necessarily motivated by expected exchange rate gains. It 
may, for instance, also serve the purpose of risk reduction. What distinguishes 
exchange rate speculation from such activities is that the expected return depends 
entirely or significantly on expected exchange rate changes - or, to be more precise, on 
the difference between the forward rate and the expected future exchange rate (cf. ch. 
2.1.). 
This is a relatively broad definition which focuses on the building and closing 
of open fx positions. In the literature, speculation is often divided into "fundamental" 
and "non-fundamental" activities. This distinction raises the normative question of 
whether currency speculation is beneficial or not. Many economists claim that short­
term speculation is the prime source of instability in the foreign exchange markets 
(Tobin (1982a) and (1982b); Dornbusch (1986) p. 31). Tobin, for example, argues that 
the expected future exchange rate is a "nebulous anchor" for the spot rate. If economic 
agents frequently revise their expectations with respect to the future exchange rate, they 
will also destabilize the spot rate. Consequently, the attacks on the EMS, or at least part 
of them, are attributed to self-fulfilling speCUlative capital movements which bear no 
connection to fundamentals.' Since speculative capital movements are mostly associated 
, See for example Bolinger (1993), EichengreenlRoselWyplosz (1994) and Vehrkamp (1992). 
Eichengreen. Rose and Wyplosz use a whole set of fundamentals, such as budget deficits and wage 
increases. Based on these fundamentals they conclude that the depreciations during the EMS crisis were 
oot always justified. Similarily, the council of economic advisors in Germany has expressed doubts about 
the necessity of some of the devaluations (Sachverstindigenrat (1992» . 
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with short-tenn capital movements, the call for a tax on capital movements, especially 
targeted at short-tenn capital movements, has been renewed.' 
Other economists, however, have argued that short-tenn capital movements are 
necessary for the proper functioning of a system of flexible exchange rates. According 
to Mayer (1985), pp. 18-19 they facilitate international transactions by dampening the 
impact on exchange rates from fluctuations originating elsewhere. However, he adds 
that "in times of stress" short-tenn capital movements can contribute to instability 
(Mayer (1985), pp. 37-38). McKinnon goes one step further than Mayer,saying that a 
flexible exchange rate system could not work without short-tenn capital movements. 
Due to instability of trade and the j-curve effect, exchange rates would be indetenninate 
without stabilizing speculation (McKinnon (1986».' If the exchange rate fluctuates 
without any noticeable change in fundamentals, according to this group, the diagnosis 
could well be "lack of speculation" instead of "too much speculation".' According to 
McKinnon (1986), the unpredictable monetary policy in many countries has raised 
uncertainty about the future exchange rate and thus reduced speculation. 
The nonnative question whether short-term speculation has been beneficial or 
not, has received much more attention than the positive question whether and to what 
extent such speculation exists.' There is, however, a large amount of empirical studies 
on the substitutability of assets in different currencies which focuses on uncovered 
interest rate parity. These studies allow a judgement about the general willingness to 
shoulder exchange rate risk to be made. The results show "that assets denominated in 
different currencies are viewed by the market as imperfect substitutes." 
(GoldsteinlMussa (1993), p. 20) This suggests that, on average, speculation is too weak 
2 For Tobin's original proposal -to throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient 
international mooey markets" see Tobin (19820), p. 489. Dornbusch (1988), p. 256 even proposed using 
"rocks". After the EMS crisis Eichengreen. Tobin and Wyplosz (1995) renewed the call for a "Tobin­
tax· . 
3 For a system of fixed exchange rates, like the period of the Gold Standard, short-term capital 
movements have been analysed La. by Arthur Bloomfield. who comes to the conclusion, that short-term 
capital movements have been mostly stabilizing, faCilitating the functioning of the system and rendering 
gold movements widely unneccesary (Bloomfield (1963), pp. 43-44). Although he observes that at certain 
times short-term capital movements have also been considerably contributing to instability. he concludes 
"that all such disequilibratiog movements of short-term funds probably could not bave persisted for loog 
on any sizeable scale, ... " (Bloomfield (1963), p. 45). 
4 Market participants support both views, that there is too much and that there is not eoough 
speculation: "The oonsensus amoog respon:Ients is that the speculator, narrowly defined, does not play his 
classical equilibrating role by haviog become too small in relation to the market's size to do so; and the 
larger volume of asset switching, leading and lagging adds to exchange market volatility. at least in the 
short run." Cf. Group of Thirty (1980), p. 25. 
'See, for instance, Siogleton (1987). 
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to equalize expected exchange rate changes and the interest rate differential. In order 
to complement the existing literature which focuses predominantly on prices, the focus 
of this study will be on quantities. The aim is to find a way how to estimate fx 
speculation and to show how it should not be estimated. At least when it comes to 
making proposals for economic policy, it should be known whether foreign currency 
speculation is an important phenomenon at all. Exchange rate volatility can also be due 
to lack of speculation, as the arguments of economists like Mayer and McKinnon show. 
Even a currency crisis like the recent EMS crisis with its massive capital flows does not 
necessarily prove the existence of strong speculative forces. What has been labelled 
"speculative attacks" may also have been to a large extent hedging. Therefore, it has 
to be analysed whether speculative position taking in the foreign exchange market is 
large enough to have a decisive effect on exchange rates.' 
In the following sections, it will first be attempted to define foreign exchange 
speCUlation. As will be shown, there is no clear dividing line between fx speculation 
and other activities in foreign exchange markets. Furthermore, it will be attempted to 
show how the composition of gross flows can be used to derive further information 
about speculation. This involves a classification of various capital account items 
according to the extent to which they are exposed to exchange rate risk (section 2.1.). 
Second, it will be discussed why the volume of capital flows during the EMS crisis or 
the volume of transactions in the foreign exchange market do not provide any reliable 
information about the amount of speculative activity. Instead, it is argued that the 
current account or the capital account can at least give an approximation of the amount 
of open fx positions (section 2.2.). In the third section, an extensive analysis of the 
interconnections of various fx market activities will be given. As will be shown, 
hedging may generate large short-term capital flows which cannot be easily 
distinguished from speCUlation. The size of these flows does not only depend on c!,pital 
and trade flows but also on net and gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. In 
addition, hedging and especially international intermediation may produce a negative 
correlation of long-term and short-term capital flows. Therefore, short-term and long­
term capital flows cannot be interpreted independently of each other (section 3). Since 
there is no clear dividing line between hedging and speculation which would allow for 
an empirical estimation of speculation with commonly used statistical methods, two 
case studies are used to obtain further insights (section 4). The use of case studies 
6 In addition, it would be useful to have some idea of the time horizon of speculative transactions. 
Speculative intraday transactions of foreign currency dealers which can be quite large seem to dominate 
(Goodhan (1988), frankel (1988». But this kind of speculation can hardly have a lasting impact on 
exchange rates. Furthermore, it cannot serve 10 smooth out the effects of volatile volumes in international 
trade, as assumed by McKinoon, because dealers are oot prepared to accumulate large open positions over 
time. 
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enables information about the structure of capital flows and the size and composition 
of stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to be drawn on. 
2. Delimitating speculation in relation to other activities in fx markets 
2.1. Theoretical problems 
The "classical" definition of speculation comes from Kaldor (1939), p. I :  
'Purchase (or sale) of  goods with a view to re-sale (or re-purchase) at a later date, 
where the motive behind such action is the expectation of a change in the relevant 
prices relatively to the ruling price and not a gain accruing through their use, or any 
kind of transformation effected in them or their transfer between different markets. ' 
So, speculation is seperated from investment, which is carried out to gain from interest 
payments, dividends etc. (the ' gain accruing' from the use of the assets), from the 
purchase of intermediate goods which enter the production process ("transformation") 
and from arbitrage ('transfer between different markets'). Sohmen has applied this 
definition to foreign exchange speculation, arguing that only an uncovered forward sale 
or purchase can be considered as "pure" currency speculation, because the profits of 
this transaction depend entirely on the difference between the forward rate and the 
future exchange rate (Sohmen (1973) p. 60).' The profit of other transactions, for 
example of an uncovered spot sale or purchase, depends also on interest rates (if they 
are not reversed at the same day). 
It is questionable, however, whether such "pure" speculation is important except 
for very short periods such as within a given day. A wider definition of speculation 
encompasses all transactions whose expected yields depend significantly on the 
difference between the forward rate and the expected future exchange rate' So, 
Sohmen's notion that speculation is based on a belief about future exchange rates which 
differs from the forward rate is retained.' Only the requirement that all profits have to 
1 If the banks require collateral or if margin requirements have to be met, this may not be true in the 
strict sense, because in this case profits may also be influenced by interest rates. An uncovered options 
transaction in foreign exc�nge comes close to pure currency speculation, as well. However, the options 
price is also influenced by interest rates and by volatility . 
• Other foreign transactions, the yield of which depends only to a limited degree (or not at all) on 
deviations between the expected exchange rate and the forward rate will be labelled �foreign invesUnent�. 
, If it is costly to transact in the forward market a market participant may choose to keep an open 
position even if he expects the future exchange rate to be equal to the forward rate. In this case, it ·is not 
the difference between the expected rate and the forward rate but the difference between the expected rate 
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be derived from this difference is relaxed. It may seem somewhat surprising that this 
definition focuses on the difference between the expected exchange rate and the forward 
rate instead of the spot rate. However, somebody who expects the future exchange rate 
to be equal to the forward rate does not need to speculate. 10 If, for instance, somebody 
owning foreign exchange expected an appreciation of the foreign currency equal to the 
forward discount, he could always convert the uncertain expected exchange rate gain 
into a certain gain by selling the foreign currency in the forward market. In practice, 
it may often be of minor importance whether speculation is based on the difference 
between the expected exchange rate and the forward rate or the expected exchange rate 
and the spot rate, because the forward rate is often close to the spot rate. II In order to 
keep the following exposition simple, a speculator will therefore be described as 
somebody who tries to profit from individually expected exchange rate changes. 
Furthennore, it seems plausible to assume that fx speculation usually takes place with 
respect to bilateral exchange rates. Somebody who expects the Yen to depreciate is 
likely to buy either US-dollars, D-Marks or sfrs. but not a whole portfolio of 20 
currencies because in the latter case transactions costs would be higher and the speed 
of adjustment lower. 
Given the above definition, which transactions could be considered exchange rate 
specUlation? For one thing, open fx positions in derivatives markets surely can be 
considered fx speculation since the return on these positions is dominated by exchange 
rate changes whereas interest rates only play a minor role. Apart from derivatives, open 
fx positions involving short-term instruments can also be considered speCUlative. For 
these transactions, risk and return are nearly entirely due to exchange rate changes. For 
very short maturities there is hardly any interest rate risk at all" whereas exchange rate 
risk can still be considerable because of the high variance of short-term exchange rates. 
A two percent hike of the exchange rate within one day is equal to an interest rate (on 
a yearly basis) of 720 percent. A two percent change within a week is equal to an 
interest rate of 103 percent and a five percent change within a week is equal to 257 
and the forward rate pluslmimls transactions costs which matters. Similarly. not every difference between 
the expected exchange rate and the forward rate will trigger speculative capital flows. If there are 
transactions costs or if investors are risk averse, there may be persistent differences erisk premia") 
between the expected exchange rate and the forward rate. 
10 In more generaJ terms, it is simply stated that speculative "transactions will only take place. when the 
speculator's opinion differs from the market opinion or when his willingness to take risks is higher (if risk 
is introduced the forward discount - or the interest rate differential - does not necessarily reflect the 
expected exchange rate change). 
11 Wider differences can only be observed when inflation differentials between countries are large. 
12 This also implies that the absolute value of the covariance between foreign returns (Gj and exchange 
rate gains (X) is low (cf. equation 3). 
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percent. Moving short-term funds for one week into a foreign currency (interest rate: 
10 percent p.a.) which unexpectedly depreciates (appreciates) 5 percent, is therefore 
equal to receiving a negative (positive) interest rate of 247 percent (p.a.). Trying to 
profit from short-term interest rate differentials of a few percentage points can be risky 
indeed (compare figures in the appendix)." Given the relatively low interest rate 
differentials and the high exchange rate risk, it can be assumed that unhedged short­
term foreign exchange positions are held to speculate on exchange rate changes. 
As the time to maturity is lengthened, the modified duration of a foreign 
investment is increased. This has two effects: returns increasingly depend on capital 
gains (see equ. l )  and the risk of foreign returns (excl. exchange rate risk) rises 
(equ.2).14 
(I)  G· = i ·  + (-Df)di· 
(2) Var(G·) = DfVar(i) 
G·: Percentage return of the foreign investment in foreign currency 
Of: Modified duration i·: Foreign interest rate 
A longer time to maturity does not necessarily mean that the actual holding 
period is also increasing. What is important is that risk (Var(G*» and return (G*) of 
a foreign asset are increased when an investor switches from short-term instruments 
into bonds of longer maturities or stocks. A market participant who buys a foreign 
long-term bond wishing to resell it within a few days can expect a return which is not 
strongly dominated by exchange rate changes because capital gains or losses can be 
considerable as well. Therefore, investments at the longer end of the bond market or 
investments in foreign stocks or other real assets cannot be interpreted as exchange rate 
speculation because their return depends significantly on capital gains or losses. 
Furthermore, if exchange rate gains are negatively correlated with foreign 
returns, the overall risk can be lower if exchange rate risk were not hedged." However, 
this possibility is only important when the risk of foreign returns (Var(G*» is not too 
LJ Hauser/l..evy (1991), p. 379 find that, �for the short-term foreign securities (one-year duration), the 
variance of the monthly rate of return is almost entirely due to e:Jtchange rate risk-. 
\. Douglas (1990), p. 62 gives some examples for the size of the modified duration of bonds with 
different maturities. For example, a 711. % bond with two years to maturity has a modified duration of 
1.82 and a 91/, " bond with ten years to maturity has a modified duration of 6.51 (under the assumption 
that interest is paid semiannually). 
\$ In addition, it is also possible that exchange rate risk is negataively correlated with local returns. See 
ch. 3.1.1. 
- 12 -
small in comparison to the exchange rate risk (Var(X» because for a low variance of 
G" the absolute value of the covariance is bound to be low as well. Therefore, this 
effect is also more important for instruments with longer maturities (equ. 3). If an 
investor holds an open fx position because a negative covariance reduces the risk of his 
foreign investment he clearly does not qualify as a fx speculator, because his main aim 
is not to profit from exchange rate movements. 
(3) R" = Var(X) + Var(G) + 2Cov(G",X) 
X: Percentage change of the exchange rate 
R": Risk (variance) in local currency of the return on foreign investments 
G": Percentage return of the foreign investment in foreign currency 
So, open positions in· fx derivatives and short-term to medium-term foreign 
assets can be interpreted as currency speculation. Furthermore, any strategy of variable 
hedging of fx risks is also fx specUlation in the wider sense. If, for instance, a market 
participant lowers the hedge ratio of foreign investments and later raises it again, he 
behaves exactly like a speculator who builds up an open position and closes it later on. 
Foreign investors, on the other hand, hold open fx positions if they consider foreign 
exchange rate risk to be low. In this case their net positions are guided by expected 
returns in the respective currencies (that is, in the currency where the investment takes 
place). If exchange rate risk is rising they will (c.p.) increasingly close these positions. 
They are not trying to profit from expected price changes" 
The reasoning above suggests, that the transition from foreign investment to 
speculation is a gradual one. It is not always easy to separate the two categories. For 
example, if an individual buys a foreign currency bond and does not hedge, the reason 
for not hedging may be risk reduction (the exchange rate may be negatively correlated 
with the price of the foreign bond or local currency investments). Or the investor thinks 
that in the long run 'currencies are a wash"." But it is also possible that the individual 
keeps the position open because he has a strong view on exchange rates, expecting a 
more favourable development of the foreign currency than is implied by the forward 
rate. In this case, expected profits depend on expected capital gains on bonds and the 
16 Such a behaviour may be due to lack of knowledge. Gennotte and Leland (1990) argue that a large 
proportion of stock investors are ill informed about fundamentals and use the current price as single or 
most important source of knowledge. See also Shleifer and Summers (1990). 
11 According to Gadkari and Spindel (1990), p. 53 this is "probably the most used line in discussions 
about international diversification". This impression is shared by Kindleberger (1987), p. 45 who states: 
"Long-term capital movements have by and large ignored exchange rate risk. " 
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difference between the forward rate and the expected exchange rate. Therefore, it is 
difficult to draw the line, where fx speculation starts and foreign investment ends. The 
same applies when existing open positions are closed. Were foreign investors 
speculating or hedging when they closed their open Pta. position in the autumn of 
19921 While in practice there is no clearcut division between these two kinds of 
activities, it can be assumed that the investorlhedger is primarily interested in profiting 
from interest rate differentials or price changes of foreign assets. For the 
investorlhedger exchange rate risk implies possible losses which he tries to avoid to a 
certain extent. The foreign currency speculator, on the other hand, wants to profit from 
exchange rate movements. Interest rate differentials which may represent either an 
additional source of income or costs of speculation are of minor importance. 
The definition of fx speculation given above implies that it is useful for certain 
purposes to distinguish foreign investments not by holding period, but by time to 
maturity. That is exactly the distinction used in balance of payments statistics. This has 
often been criticized. Many economists have argued that it is misleading to speak of a 
long-term capital export if somebody purchases a foreign bond with ten years to 
maturity, because he can (and often will) sell it within a few days. But the fact that a 
capital transaction is reversed within a short period says little about the reasons for this 
move. Time to maturity, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a rough proxy for 
interest rate risk. Separating capital flows according to time to maturity into short-term 
and long-term flows can therefore help to get a better understanding of the different 
economic forces behind "long-term" and "short-term" capital flows and can help to 
separate specUlative and non-speculative capital flows." Further information could be 
gained if the capital balance could be divided into more components, for example: 
short-term credits, 
long-term credits (variable interest rate), 
bonds, 
equity, 
direct investment, land etc. 
This list of assets is characterised by a declining significance of the relative 
exchange rate risk. 
II This holds only with respect to fx speculation. Interest rate specuJation is briefly addressed in ch. 3.2. 
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2.2. Empirical problems 
Which market participants are speculating and what are their strategies? One 
group of market participants which is speculating in foreign exchange markets are 
industrial enterprises with foreign exchange operations. Studies conducted by the Group 
of Thirty in 1979 and 1985 (Group of Thirty (1980) and (1985» as well as more recent 
investigations (Soenen/Aggarwal (1989), Glaum (1994» show, that most firms are 
following a strategy of selective hedging." Although corporate treasurers usually reply 
that they think that it is in general impossible to beat the market, most of them report 
positive results from their selective hedging strategies (Group of Thirty (1980), p. 8 and 
(1985), p. 42). In other words, although paying lip service to market efficiency,'" the 
respondends try to beat the market and claim to be successful in doing just that. So, for 
many large firms foreign currency operations have become an additional profit center 
(Goldstein et al. (1993), p. 5) 
Even more important for forex trading activities are institutional investors. This 
group has been increasingly active in forex markets and invested an increasing portion 
of their portfolios in foreign assets." According to the Group of Ten (1993), p. 6 "the 
most significant development in foreign exchange markets in recent years is the 
emergence of these investors as major participants in the market." During the 1980s 
institutional investors increased the share of foreign assets strongly - in many cases by 
a factor of five or more (Bisignano (1994), p. 32). The largest proportion of these funds 
were put into stocks (14-100%, median 55%) and bonds (median 37%),(Group of 
Thirty (1985), p. 49). 70 percent of fund managers implemented changing views on 
exchange rates by selective hedging of stocks and bonds (Group of Thirty (1985), p. 
50). Only 18 percent of respondents made currency decisions more often than foreign 
investment decisions. The average time horizon for individual foreign investments lay 
between one and three years. The average time horizon for currency decisions lay 
between four and twelve months (p. 51). 59 percent described their exchange rate 
analysis as "fundamental", 30 percent as "technical" (p. 52). 
Some of these findings could be confirmed in later studies of the foreign 
19 This view is confirmed by Giddy (1994), p. 481. Giddy also mentions anecdotal evidenc� that the 
amount of discretion in exchange rate management rises with the sophistication of a firm. 
:lD Many col"JX'rate treasurers do not even seem to know the efficient market hypothesis. Glaum (1994), 
p. 88 found that from 22 treasurers of large German industrial enterprises on1y two knew the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
21 Although the relative importance of international investment has increased, the level of international 
divemfication is still surprisingly low. See French/Poterba (1991) and GoldsteinIMussa (1993), pp. 22-4. 
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investment behaviour of institutional investors conducted by Davis (Davis (1988) and 
(1991». He also found that fund managers mainly followed a strategy of selective 
hedging. "Discretion is the main strategy." (Davis (1991), p. 35) Managers believed 
in market efficiency, however, they did not trust in historical covariances. 
Furthermore, they doubted that market efficiency was also given in the short run. 
Rather, they presumed the existence of herding phenomena (Davis (1991), p. 48). 
Therefore, relatively wide tactical deviations from strategically set currency 
compositions were allowed (Davis (1991), p. 39). Unlike the Group of Thirty report, 
Davis found that institutional investors were treating foreign equity and foreign bond 
investment differently. Bond exposures were hedged to a far larger degree (Davis 
(1991), p. 45). 
A special group of investors, which has received much attention lately, are hedge 
funds. The capital employed in hedge funds is tiny as compared to other institutional 
investors (Group of Ten (1993), p. 49). The McKinsey Global Institute estimates the 
value of total assets of hedge funds in 1993 to be around US$ 75 bn. (McKinsey 
(1994), ch. 4, p. 7).This compares to U.S. mutual funds assets of around US$ 2.075 
bn. (McKinsey (1994), ch. 5, p. 10). Ferrill Capital Management, a firm which tracks 
forex fund performance, estimates that investment funds devote about US$ 10 bn. to 
currency speculation - an amount which normally will be leveraged up to five times 
(Hansell (1992), p. 36). However, they transact aggressively in the markets and are 
willing to take high risks. Using their assets as collateral or initial margin they can 
acheive high leverage." Furthermore, they may act as opinion leaders providing signals 
to other market participants (Goldstein et al. (1993), p. I I)." 
Trading in fx markets is dominated by large banks and securities houses which 
act as market makers. Both usually have tight limits for their traders' overnight 
positions. Intraday positions, however, may be quite large and it is estimated that the 
aggregated position of banks and market makers may at times be very large (Goodhart 
(1988». Still, despite the fact that the bulk of fx trading takes place in the interbank 
market, the influence of interbank traders is "diffuse in terms of influencing the 
direction of rates" (Hansell (1992), p. 36). Furthermore, limits on open positions seem 
to have become tighter recently." The propriety trading desks of some securities houses 
22 Goldstein et al. (1993), p. S have estimated that hedge funds can leverage their capital by a factor 
up to ten. 
%I After high profi� in the years 1990 to 1993, most of them incurred losses in 1994. Some funds have 
reacted by reducing their capital base and running smaller risks (leveraging less). See Gawith (1995b). 
:w The immense losses on bonds in 1994 and the VOlatility of exchange rates seem to have led to a 
reassessment of risks and the capital for proprietary trading has been cut down. See Gewitz (1995) and 
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and investment banks which employ part of the finn's capital in speculative activity are 
also active in fx markets. However, the size of these trades is small relative to the 
market (Hansell (1992), p. 36)." If the speculative activities during the EMS crisis 
were representative for fx speculation in general, banks are not among the active 
speculators (Garberrraylor (1995), p. 175). Not only are they constrained in many 
countries in taking large open foreign currency positions. They did not even reach the 
limits set by regulation. U.S. banks which are less constrained did also not build up 
large open positions. As an IMF report on the EMS crisis concludes: "The international 
banking system does not appear to have taken unusually large open positions in foreign 
exchange during the crisis." (Goldstein et al. (1993), p. II). Banks mainly seem to 
have gained during the crisis by financing the speculation and carrying out 
transactions.26 
The wealthy individual as a stabilizing speculator with a long-term horizon seems 
to play no significant role in exchange markets anymore (Brown (1983)). Based on the 
existing knowledge about risk aversion, transaction costs and exchange rate volatility. 
Goodhart and Taylor (1992) show that fx speculation would be too risky for most 
individuals except "extremely wealthy individuals". While wealthy individuals lost 
significance, some central banks seem to have become more active players, actively 
managing their reserves (Hansell (1992), p.36). 
Unfortunately, it is easier to find out who is speculating than to estimate the 
quantitative significance of speCUlation. Often, foreign exchange market turnover is 
used to show that short-term speculation is huge in volume, dominating other 
transacting by far. 27 Indeed, when compared to the volume of international trade or 
official reseIVes, turnover in foreign exchange markets is immense. However, the fact 
that turnover is about 40 to 50 times larger than international trade does not mean that 
97 or 98 percent of turnover is due to speculation." Equally, owning official reserves 
no more than the turnover of one day does not mean that central banks have no 
Gawith (I995a). See also Hansell (1992) p. 36 who reports reduced exposure already for 1992. 
2'1 In any event, the bulk of the activity seems to be in bonds (Freeman (1995). 
216 This cautious approach can be explained by empirical evidence which supports the view that position 
taking is oot a reliable source of revenues and profits. See Braas/Bravler (1990) who find that "jobbing" 
in the market and customer business are the primary sources of profit in fx trading operations. 
" See, for instance, Aliber (1987), pp. 21()'212, EichengreeniWyplosz (1993), Leuschel (1988), 
Nailing (1993), Schulmeister (1987), Siebert (1991), p. 354. 
2t Foreign exchange market turnover on a normal day in 1992 was estimated to be US$ 880 bn. See 
BIS (1993). The volume of world exports in 1992 was US$ 3.688 trll. and official reserves (excl. gold) 
amounted to US$ 953 bn. at the end of the year. See IMF (a). 
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influence on exchange rates. After all, turnover is just turnover. It says little about the 
willingness of market participants to hold open positions." High turnover (and/or high 
exchange rate volatility) may even be the result of the missing willingness to be short 
or long in a foreign currency for a period longer than a few minutes or hours. In this 
case market makers close their open positions more quickly and inter bank trade 
increases (Burnham (1991), p. 135; Brown (1983), p. 17, McKinnon (1986) and Mayer 
(1985». 
The theoretical analysis offx speculation seems to imply that the volume of 
short-term capital movements can be used to estimate speCUlation. However, this is not 
the case because it is not known to what extent transactions are hedged. As will be 
shown in this paper, hedged short-term capital movements can be due to changes in 
long-term capital flows or changing hedging behaviour of long-term 
investorslborrowers and foreign traders. What looks like erratic and destabilizing 
behaviour of short-term funds may indeed be simply the result of changes originating 
at the longer end of the market. Long-term capital movements, which are usually 
regarded as relatively stable components of international capital flows, can therefore 
contribute more to instability than is suggested by a simple look at balance of payments 
statistics. 
Current account or capital account balances are a better measure for the amount 
of open foreign exchange positions than turnover figures. Any surplus or deficit on 
current account implies that someone must have been prepared to shoulder exchange 
rate risk. This may be central banks - in this case the counterposition to the balitnce on 
current accouht is a change in international reserves - or other market participants - in 
this case the counterposition to the balance on current account can be found in the 
capital account. Both the large balances on current account and the huge net capital 
flows of the 1980s and early 1990s clearly show that there are market participants 
which are prepared to shoulder exchange rate risk. However, it is neither very well 
known who these are nor based on which considerations such open foreign exchange 
positions are held. Therefore, a closer look at foreign exchange markets is needed in 
order to get an idea which part of these open positions is based on speculative 
transactions. This is a complicated matter, because most international statistics record 
capital flows or stocks of foreign assets or liabilities but they do not contain information 
to what extent these stocks or flows are hedged (Benzie (1992), p. 52). 
If the various components of the capital account were independent of each other 
and independent of derivatives transactions, it would be easier io discriminate between 
"Compare Kriiger (1994) and (1995). 
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speculative and non-speculative capital movements. Simple empirical tests, such as 
Turner (1991), pp. 91-94 could enhance the knowledge of the underlying causes for 
capital flows considerably. Turner, for example, found that changes of short-term 
banking flows were more closely correlated with changes of the "financing 
requirements" of a country (balance on current account plus change in reserves)30 than 
any other item of the capital account. Therefore, he concludes that changes in the 
current account have mostly been financed by short-term banking flows (Turner (1991), 
p. 91) and that these short-term flows have to be classified as "accommodating" capital 
flows.31 However, this conclusion is valid only if these short-term capital movements 
are not tied to capital movements in the opposite direction or derivatives transactions. 
Since Turner himself argues that short-term capital flows are hedged to a greater extent 
than long-term capital flows,:n it is not possible to draw direct conclusions from his 
findings, as tempting as that may be. 
Casual evidence suggests that there are indeed links between the various items 
of the capital account. For instance, German short-term and long-term capital 
movements exhibited a negative correlation for many years. During the early phase of 
German Unification, when the overall capital balance shifted from deficit into surplus, 
this pattern was disturbed. Lately, it has been reemerging however (cf. case study 
Germany). Another example is Japan. During the 1980s, Japan experienced long-term 
capital outflows and short-term capital inflows (again: especially short-term banking 
flows). When the balance of long-term capital movements turned from deficit into 
surplus around 1990, the short-term capital balance moved in the opposite direction (cf. 
case study Japan). 
If · long-term and short-term capital flows are related, it is not possible to 
interpret either short-term or long-term flows independently and it becomes necessary 
to analyse the causes for this relationship. There is a number of factors which could 
help to explain the connection between short-term and long-term capital movements. 
For instance, short-term capital movements may be used to hedge long-term capital 
movements. Insofar as short-term capital movements do indeed reflect the hedging 
behaviour of long-term investors and foreign traders, they would have to be interpreted 
3l This is, of course, equal to the capital account. So, Turner. in effect, regresses the capital account 
on its components. 
31 The distinction between "autonomous" and "accommodating" capital flows goes back to Meade 
(1951). See also Machlup (1983) who uses the term "induced" instead of "accommodating". 
32 For instance, the marginal dollar which a lapanese banks invests in foreign assets has to be financed 
-M.th a foreign currency credit (l.P.Morgan (1989), p. 3). 1berefore, these flows do not constirute a source. 
of finance for trade balances. Given the tight restrictions on banks' foreign currency exposure in many 
. countries, the same probably applies in other countries and to other instruments as well. 
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as non-speculative flows, passively adopting to the amount of hedging. Another factor 
which can account for offsetting short-term and long-term capital movements is 
international intermediation, that is, simultaneous foreign borrowing and lending in 
order to profit from interest rate differentials (between assets denominated in the same 
currency) or interest rate changes." Finally, simultaneous inflows and outflows will be 
recorded in the balance of payments whenever foreigners are shifting between different 
kinds of local assets. 
3. 1be intenelationships between derivatives, short-term and long-term 
capital movements 
3 . 1 .  Hedging 
3 . 1 . 1 .  Hedging of long-term and short-term assets 
It is not very well known to what extent short-term and long-term capital 
movements are hedged, but it seems to be generally accepted that "long-term flows tend 
to be covered by forward exchange contracts to a much smaller extent than short-term 
flows. "  (Turner (1991), p. 79) In what follows, it will be explored why long-term 
investments may, on average, be less hedged. 
Viewed in isolation, an investment in foreign assets which is not hedged is likely 
to be much riskier than a foreign investment which is hedged. Only if there were a 
sufficiently strong negative correlation between the exchange rate gain (X) and the 
foreign return (G") would a hedged investment be riskier (see Table 1). Provided the 
expected return on hedging (i.e forward discount or premium minus his own expected 
exchange rate change) is zero, hedging is therefore to be preferred whenever 
transactions costs are low. This is the "free lunch in currency hedging" 
(perold/Schulman (1990)). As far as portfolios are considered which consist only of 
foreign assets, this free lunch does. indeed seem to exist. However, for most investors 
the portfolio consists mainly of local assets with only a small proportion invested in 
foreign assets (Goldstein et a1. (1993), p. 3, Bisignano (1994), p. 32). If the foreign 
investment is part of a portfolio which consists of local and foreign assets, not only the 
variance of the exchange rate (Var(X) and the covariance of exchange rate changes (X) 
and foreign returns (G") have to be considered but also the covariance between 
33 The latter would probably not qualify as intermediation in the narrow sense and should rather be 
labelled "interest rate speculation". 
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exchange rate changes (X) and local returns (E). In this case, it is no longer clear 
whether complete hedging is advisable. Most studies found that, from the perspective 
of a US investor, hedging was to be preferred (Filatov/Rappoport (1992), 
GadkariiSpindel (1990), Thomas III (1990)). However, for other countries the results 
were quite different, suggesting that in many cases it was more efficient not to hedge 
(FiIatovlRappoport (1992), GadkariiSpindel (1990» . Furthermore, Jorion (1990) shows 
that hedging does not significantly change the risk of the portfolio when the share of 
foreign assets is low. 
Table 1 Interest Rate Risk and Exchange Rate Risk 
Local investment Forei,gn investment 
Interest plus exchange R = OYar'(i) RO = Yar'(X) + 
rate risk: OOYar'(i")+ 2Cov(Go,X) 
Expected return" E = i + Odi' EO = j" + OOdio,+ X 
Risk of a mixed portfolio RP = w;VarE+ (I-w,/VarG° + (l-w..)'(l-h)'VarX 
(local, hedged and +2[w.(l-w..)Cov(E,G)+w.(l-w..)(I-h)Cov(E,X) 
unhedlled foreil(n assets) +(I-w)'(!-hlCov(Go,X») 
Expected return of a EP = w,;E + (I-w..)[Go +hF+(I -h)X) 
mixed portfolio 
F = Forward discount (premium) 
Yar' = Expected variance 
o = Mndified duration of the local investment 
h = Hedge ratio 
X = Expected exchange rate change in percent 
w, = weight of the local investment in the portfolio 
P = Portfolio 
R = Risk 
E = Expected return 
GO = iO + Opio, 
* = Foreign variables 
These findings show that the inclusion of unhedged foreign assets does not 
necessarily imply fx speculation. Given sufficiently small or even negative covariances, 
unhedged foreign investments can be used to diversify and decrease the risk of the 
overall portfolio in quite the same way as hedged foreign investments. In some cases, 
risk reduction may be even higher when the foreign currency risk is not hedged. Thus, 
keeping an open fx position may often simply be a device to reduce risks. 
For a mixed portfolio with a large share of local assets the case for hedging does 
not seem to be very strong. At least at current levels of international diversification, the 
". Ignoring the cross product term in the equation which yields the expected return of a foreign 
investment. 
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effect of hedging on the risk of the portfolio is likely to be small and may at times be 
even negative. However, once it is taken into account that historical covariances may 
not be stable over time, 3� a risk averse investor may be unwilling to rely too much on 
these covariances. This may help to explain the low degree of international 
diversification and may similarily provide a rationale for hedging. The example of the 
US shows that an unhedged foreign investment may, at times, be clearly much riskier 
than a hedged one. In the early 1980s, the combination of a high volatility of the 
effective exchange rate of the US dollar (i.e. high correlation of bilateral exchange rate 
changes) and a positive correlation between foreign returns (G") and exchange rate 
gains sharply increased the risk of unhedged foreign investments. 
All these empirical analyses focus on stocks and bonds." This reflects the fact 
that bonds and stocks account for the lion's share in international portfolios. Short-term 
instruments are much less significant. International money funds, which specialize in 
investing in short-term instruments, only have a small market share.37 The low 
importance of short-term assets in international portfolios contrasts sharply with the 
high volume of transactions in short-tenn instruments in international financial markets. 
This indicates that investment in local and foreign short-term assets seems to be driven 
by somewhat different considerations than investment in stocks and bonds. 
Liquidity management, for instance, acts under the binding constraint that at 
certain points in time cash balances must be available to make payments. Therefore, 
only short-term assets (debts) are employed because these assets do not involve any 
price risk. This is due to the fact that the modified duration approaches zero as the time 
to maturity goes to zero. Therefore, the variance of returns over the period to maturity 
of a short-term instrument is zero. The same is true for a foreign short-term asset -
when it is hedged. Adding exchange rate risk would make a virtually safe asset into a 
risky one, making it unsuitable for liquidity management. 
Furthermore, a large share of transactions in foreign short-term assets are 
carried out by banks. For the large Eurobanks which perform market making functions 
in the international money market, the composition of short-term assets is mainly 
3.1 Most authors agree that historical hedge ratios may perform poorly out�f-sample. See, for instance 
HauserlUovy (1991), Eaker/GrantIWoodard (1991) and KaplanisiSchaefer (1991). Furthermore, if stock 
or bond markets move together internationally, capital losses canoot be offset simultaneously in all 
countries (GadkarilSpindel (1990» . If, for instance, the US dollar appreciates, foreign investors gain on 
their dollar investments but US investors lose on their open fx positions. 
l6 Usually a portfolio is asswned which consists of 60 percent stocks and 40 percent bonds. This ratio 
is supp:>sed to reflect the average portfolio composition of institutional investors (Jorion (1990), p. 41). 
" See Flightll.ee-Swan ( 1988), pp. 1 17-124. 
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determined by customers. Therefore, the composition of their assets may rapidly 
change and it is easier for them to hedge individual transactions (Le. look for funding 
in the same currency), than to rely on diversification. The same is true for their fx 
derivatives trades, which are also mostly customer driven. If open derivatives positions 
cannot be quickly closed by an offsetting derivatives position, it will be hedged in the 
money markets. Finally, in many countries regulation prevents banks from holding 
large foreign exchange positions." Since banking flows usually account for a large 
fraction of short-term capital flows it can be assumed that a considerable portion of 
short-term capital flows is hedged. 
If a large part of short-term movements does not involve open fx positions at all 
- at least not longer than a few minutes or hours39 - the question arises whether net 
short-term capital flows can be used as an approximation of fx speculation. For 
instance, a net outflow must not necessarily constitute an open position because it can 
be covered by a derivatives transaction or a long-term inflow. As will be shown, 
hedging of capital flows or stocks of foreign assets and liabilities can produce erratic 
behaviour of short-term capital flows. 
3 . 1 .2. The role of short-term capital flows in hedging 
In this section the interrelationships between hedging activities and short-term 
capital flows will be explored in some detail. The aim is to have a better understanding 
of the " mechanics" of the market in order to be able to better interpret short-term 
capital movements. It will be shown how hedging of capital flows or of stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities can affect net short-term capital flows. Furthermore, it will 
be analysed to what extent this interrelationship is affected by the use of derivatives. 
This excercise will also prove to be useful in understanding the channneis through 
which fx speculation in derivatives markets affects exchange rates. 
3 . l .2. l .  Hedging in the money markets 
In order to demonstrate the impact of selective hedging of long-term capital 
movements or transactions in international trade on short-term capital flows, a few 
31 See Goldstein etal. (1993) pp. 5-7 and 36-39. The authors also note that'even during the EMS crisis 
banks did not usually take large open fx positions limiting their activities to market making and the 
provision of credit to hedgers and speculators (pp. 1 1-12). 
39 It should be noted that in certain situations hours may be enough to break a currency. 
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simplifying assumptions are made: 
There are only two countries: the US and Germany. 
All short-term transactions are hedged. 
Hedging takes place in the local and foreign money market. 
In the initial equilibrium short-term capital flows are assumed to be zero. 
Long-term capital flows in both directions can be denominated in either 
currency. The same is true for the denomination of the trade contract. The currency 
risk can be hedged or not. 
Table 2 Hedging and Short-term Capital Movements 
Transaction Currency Hed2in2-Behaviour Money Market 
German Capital 1m - in OM Americans hedge OM Creditl$ Invest. 
(US Capital Ex) Am. do not hedge ----
or 
German Goods 1m - in US$ Germans hedge DM Credit/$ Invest. 
(US Goods Ex) Ge. do not hedge -----
German Capital Ex - in OM Americans hedge $ CreditiOM Invest. 
(US Capital 1m) Am. do not hedge ----
or 
German Goods Ex - in USS Germans hedge $ CreditlDM Invest. 
(uS Goods 1m) Ge. do not hed2e ----
In Table 2 the effects of decisions regarding currency denomination and hedging 
on short-term capital movements are given. This overview shows that the currency 
denominations either of bonds or trade contracts are not relevant for the effects of 
hedging on short-term capital movements. Whether German capital imports or goods 
imports (US capital exports or goods exports) are denominated in OM or dollar, 
hedging will take place in the form of a short-term capital export to the US. The same 
is true for the denomination of American capital- and goods imports (German capital­
and goods exports). The important question is whether those who carry the currency 
risk are hedging or not. 
Table 2 seems to suggest that there is a clear-<:ut relationship between long-term 
and short-tertn capital movements if hedging takes place. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case. A balanced long-term capital account may go along with no short-term capital 
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movements at all, with a balanced short-term capital account or with a net movement 
of funds into one of the countries. If there is a net long-term capital flow, for example 
from Germany to the US, it can be expected that short-term capital will flow in the 
opposite direction. However, other possibilities exist. If German investors are hedging 
their foreign investments less than their American counterparts, then a balanced s'hort­
term capital account or a net flow to Germany may be the result. 
In the following figures (Figure 1 and 2) the various possibilities are explored 
under the assumption that short-term capital flows only serve as a means of hedging. 
a. Constant hedge ratio 
In this case capital imports and capital exports are both hedged in equal 
proportions. Consequently net short-term capital flows are a constant fraction of net. 
long-term capital flows (always going in the opposite direction). 
b. Variable hedge ratio 
In this case, the hedge ratio for long-term capital exports and imports is still 
equal.  However. it varies over time. Therefore. even when net long-term capital flows 
are constant, net short-term capital flows vary. However, net short-term capital still 
flows in the opposite direction. 
Figure 1 Hedging of Long-term Capital Flows 
a. Constant hedge ratio 
b. Variable hedge ratio 
_ Short-term _ Long-term 
c. Divergent hedge ratios 
lf hedge ratios are not only variable over time but may also differ for capital 
imports or exports, short-term capital flows may vary not only in size, they may also 
change the direction - even though gross and net long-term capital flows are constant. 
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d. Variable hedging of stocks 
If the analysis includes changes in the hedging of stocks. net short-term capital 
flows may even be bigger than gross long-term capital flows. 
Thus, even if long-term capital flows exhibit a fairly stable pattern, hedging of 
stocks and flows may induce err.atie short-term capital movements.40 The size of the 
flows depends on the desired hedge ratio of long-term investors and the size of long­
term capital flows and net foreign assets. If net foreign assets have been accumulating 
over time a changing hedging behaviour may generate enormous short-term capital 
flows (see case study of Spain). 
Figure 2 Hedging of Stocks and Flows 
c. Divergent hedge ratios 
d. Variable hedging of stocks 
_ Short-term Cap. 0 Long-term elm _ Long-term eEx 
These considerations show that it is unfortunately not possible to predict what 
kind of short-term capital flows will be induced by changes in the balance on long-term 
capital. This can only be done when the components of long-term capital flows are 
known andlor the reasons for observed changes in the long-term account. It is, for 
example, quite likely that short-term capital movements are not affected by direct 
.I) Genootte aOO Leland (1990) present a model in which the hedging activities of stock market invc:stllrs 
can accoun! for stock market crashc:s. 
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investment flows, because foreign direct investment is usually not hedged.41 Portfolio 
investment, on the other hand, is hedged to a certain degree. Therefore, changes in 
flows of portfolio capital should lead to corresponding short-term capital flows in the 
opposite direction. However, it is also conceivable that long-term investors increase 
capital imports and at the same time induce short-term capital imports. Such a move 
could be expected if sentiment shifts against the foreign currency (for example US$) 
and if it is expected, that the local currency (for example DM) appreciates. In this case 
hedging of open positions in DM would be reduced and hedging of open positions in 
US$ increased. As a result, long-term capital inflows would be accompanied by 
increase� short-term inflows. 
Although the effects of long-term capital flows on short-term capital flows can 
be manifold, certain general conclusions may still be appropriate. If long-term and 
short-term capital move in opposite directions, it can be assumed that at least part of 
the short-term capital flows serve the purpose of hedging. This applies specifically for 
short-term banking flows. Therefore, if net long-term capital flows are larger than net 
short-term capital flows, the difference can be used as a rough approximation of the 
amount of unhedged long-term capital flows." 
But, as has been pointed out, short-term capital movements may be no longer 
needed as a hedging instrument because of the immense increase in the use of 
derivatives.43 Instead of using a money market hedge most traders and many investors 
make use of derivatives to hedge open foreign currency positions. However, this 
qualification is not as important as it may seem. As will be shown in the following 
paragraphs, many transactions in derivatives markets feed back on the international 
money markets and have repercussions which become visible in the short-term capital 
account. 
3.1.2.2 Hedging in the forward market 
Following the BIS (1993), the term "forward market" can be defined in the 
broad sense, comprising the "outright forward" market and the "foreign-exchange 
41 1bis is due to the nature of the assets involved. In the case of nominal shocks, the price movements 
of these assets are likely to partly offset exchange rate changes. 
� See I.P.Morgan (1989), p. 8. 
a I.P. Morgan (1989), p. 8. 
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swap' market." The outright forward market, which mainly serves to provide forward 
cover for customer.; is much smaller than the swap market. Its share in total exchange 
market activity is about 7 percent, while the share of the swap market is about 39 
percent (BIS (1993), p. 17). 
- The outright forward market 
Instead of a money market hedge, a foreign trader or a long-term capital 
importer/exporter may prefer to use the forward market." Table 3 shows how various 
transactions can be hedged in the forward market, creating demand or supply for 
forward dollars (forward OM). 
Table 3 Forward Market Repercussions of Hedging Activities 
Transaction Currency Hedllinll-Behaviour Forward Market 
Ger.Cap.-Im - in OM Americans hedge Supply of (1m I) 
(US Cap.-Ex) forward OM 
Ger.Goods-Im Am. do not hedge ---- (1m 2) 
(US Goods-Ex) - in US-$ Germans hedge Supply of (1m 3) 
forward OM 
Ge. do not hedge ----- (I"m 4L 
Ger. Cap.-Ex - in OM Americans hedge Demand for (Ex 1) 
(US Cap.-Im) forward OM 
Ger. Goods-Ex Am. do not hedge ---- (Ex 2) 
(US Goods-1m) - in US-$ Germans hedge Demand for (Ex 3) 
forward OM 
Ge. do not hedge ---- (Ex 4) 
.. Often, the simple term Rswap" is used leaving it to the reader to decide which kind of swap is meant. 
Therefore, Giddy's distinction between "foreign�xchange swaps" and ·currency swaps· is used. (See 
Giddy (1994), p.IS.) 10 a currency swap, interest aOO principal in different currencies are exchanged. TIie 
foreign-exchange swap consists of a combination of a spot purchase of one currency against another and 
the repurchase of the currency sold, at a certain date in the future. This having been said, hereafter the 
term "swap" will be used as an abbreviation for "foreign-exchange swap" . 
� The table does not include the possibility that foreign exchange exposure is only partly hedged. 
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If hedging is restricted to the forward market, the principal hedging decisions" 
of the long-term investorsfborrowers and international traders on the forward market 
can be easily illustrated (see Table 4). As can be seen, in 4 cases the forward market 
is not touched at all. In 4 additional cases supply and demand rise by equal amounts. 
[n the other 8 cases, however, there is an excess supply of or excess demand for 
forward DM. These excess supplies or demands could, of course, be reduced by price 
changes. However, as soon as the forward quotations start to move, covered interest 
arbitrage becomes possible and arbitrageurs, usually banks, will provide "forward 
cover" .  The forward rates are fixed by covered interest rate arbitrage." 
Table 4 Long-term Capital Flows, Hedging and the Forward Market 
Ex I Ex2 Ex 3 Ex 4 
1m I D = S XS D = S  XS 
1m 2 XD D = S = O XD D = S = O  
1m 3 D = S XS D = S XS 
1m 4 XD D = S = 0 XD D = S = 0 
D: Demand for forward DM (supply of forward dollar) 
S: Supply of forward DM (demand for forward dollar) 
XD: Excess demand for forward DM (excess supply of forward dollar) 
XS: Excess supply of forward DM (excess demand for forward dollar) 
If there is an excess supply of forward DM, banks will buy the excess amounts 
and provide the required forward dollar. This transaction can be covered by borrowing 
DM, converting these into dollars and investing the dollar proceeds." This amounts to 
a short-term capital flow into the US. In the case of an excess demand for DM, there 
would be a short-term capital flow from the US to Germany. Thus, even if hedging 
takes place in the forward market it may cause a short-term capital movement from 
Germany to the US or vice-versa. 
� The table does not include the possibility that foreign exchange exposure is only pardy hedged . 
• 7 Empirical evidence clearly supports this "Cambist" view of the forward market and rejects the 
-Modern View". See Brooks/Cuthbertson/Mayes (1986), pp. 38. 
oil lfbanks hedge their open forward positions in the swap market (nowadays a common practice, see 
Giddy (1994), p. 182), the resulting adjustment process is more complicated. This case wiU be considered 
in the next paragraph. 
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Hedging in the forward market has a lot in common with a money market hedge. 
In both cases of hedging there is a short-term capital movement. In the case of a 
forward hedge the short-term capital movement of the hedger is replaced by a capital 
movement of a bank. Therefore, such forward transactions can be interpreted as a 
credit from the bank to the counterparty in the forward deal (Goldstein et al. (1993). 
Since forward transactions with customers also involve counterparty risk for the bank, 
just like credit risk in case of a loan, they require a certain amount of collateral 
(according to Garber and Taylor (1995) New York banks ask for 10 percent). 
Therefore, it is not correct to characterize forward speculation as "speculation without 
capital" (Vehrkamp (1992)). 
- The swap market 
The swap market has become the crucial link between credit markets, spot 
market and forward markets (see Figure 3). Highly developed swap markets make it 
possible to shop around in various money markets without incurring exchange rate risk. 
For example, Swiss and Canadian banks are said to use the dollar money market, 
swapping in and out of the dollar, and thus profiting from the depth and liquidity of this 
market (BIS (1993), p. 20; Brown (1983), p. 103). Swaps also connect the spot market 
with the forward market, allowing a spot transaction to be converted into a forward 
transaction and a forward transaction into a spot transaction (see Table 5). This capacity 
was widely used by speculators during the EMS crisis. Instead of using the forward 
market directly, they used the spot market and financed their DM purchases with swaps 
- thus converting a spot position into a forward position." Furthermore, swaps can be 
used to roll an expiring forward positon over.'" 
It is this variety of uses which contributes to the depth and liquidity of the swap 
market," whose turnover is only a little smaller than turnover in spot markets. 
According to the BIS, in April 1992 daily turnover in the swap markets amounted to 
49 A detailed analysis of these activities can be found in Linde/Alonso (1993). 
jQ A forward position which is due in two days can be combined, for example, with a three months 
swap in order to generate a three months forward. 
'I Another factor is the relatively small risk for market makers. The interest rate differential between 
two currencies is usually less volatile than interest ratestbemselves or exchange rates. Therefore, bid-ask 
spreads in the s-.vap market tend to be very narrow, and limits on intra- and inter-day positions wider. See 
Brown (1983), p. 21. 
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USS 324 bn. (39% of total net-net turnover" ) while turnover in the spot markets was 
estimated. to be around US$ 394 bn. (47 % of total net-net turnover). 
Figure 3 "Overlappiog Market Triangles"" 
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One way to hedge foreign currency exposure is the sale or purchase of forward 
foreign exchange. This has been discussed already in the preceding paragraph. As has 
been shown, such forward transactions will induce short-term capital flows by those 
banks who take the counterposition in the forward deal. Nowadays, banks do not use 
covered interest rate arbitrage to hedge their forward business. Instead, they simply use 
the swap and the spot market. If they have, for example, sold forward dollars against 
OM, so that they are short in forward dollars and long in forward OM, they simply buy 
dollars in the spot market and swap these back into OM. Taken together, these two 
transactions are equivalent to a sale of forward OM. Generally speaking, each of the 
three transactions, spot, swap and forward, can be interpreted as a combination of the 
other two. 
To derive the result of the various combinations of these three deals, one can 
simply add up the positions at each date for each transaction, with offsetting long and 
short positions canceling each other out (see Table 5). For example: 
swap I + spot I = forward 2 
swap I + forward I = spot 2 
spot 2 + forward 2 = swap I etc. 
The fact that banks do not hedge their forward positions by borrowing in one 
currency and lending in another, does not necessarily mean that the credit markets in 
52 Adjusted for local and cross-border double counting. Total reported net-net turnover was US$ 832 
ho. Including estimated gaps in reporting the total amount was estimated to be US$ 880 ho. See BIS 
(1993), pp. 5 and 17. 
53 This table is taken from Brown (1983), p. 67. 
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· Table 5 Combining Swap-, Spot- and Forward Transactions 
Oeal in 10 Oelivery in t in t, 
Swap I ($ - >  OM) Ion.!! OM - short $ short OM - long $ 
Swap 2 (OM - >  $) short OM - long $ long OM - short $ 
Spoil ($-purchase) short OM - long $ 
Spot 2 ($-sale) long OM - short $ 
Forward I ($-sale) long OM - short $ 
Forward 2 ($-purch.) short OM - long $ 
both countries are not affected." If a bank sells forward dollars to a customer and tries 
to neutralize this transaction by buying dollars spot and swapping them into OM, it 
creates an additional demand for dollar/OM swaps - in other words it supplies what 
could be labelled "temporary dollar balances" and demands "temporary OM balances" .  
To find somebody who is willing to swap OM into dollar, the bank has to bid up the 
swap rate (the difference between the spot rate [OM/$) and the forward rate). Given 
the size and the liquidity of the swap market a tiny increase will be sufficient to induce 
market participants to swap their OM balances into dollars and invest those dollars in 
the dollar credit market. So, a chain of transactions which started with a customer 
selling forward OM to a bank finally leads to a short-term capital flow from Germany 
to the US. 
Whether the banks cover forward commitments in the credit markets or in the 
swap market, in both cases a customer order induces a spot transaction and a short-term 
capital flow." Therefore, the informative content of short-term capital flows about the 
amount of hedging of long-term investors and foreign traders is not reduced when these 
two groups cover their positions in the forward market. In addition, the same applies 
to speculators who use the forward market for fx speCUlation. Their transactions will 
also cause short-term capital flows of banks. 
S' The following also applies if a customer directly hedges in the swap and spot market. 
5' This is not aU that surprising. If there were no swaps and forwards, the customer would have to 
borrow OM and convert these into dollars in order to hedge the exchange risk of the future DM payment 
he is expecting to receive. The various transactions described duplicate this transaction - however cheaper. 
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3 . 1 .2.3. Hedging in the futures market 
Futures have much in common with forwards. But given the liquidity of the 
futures market and the small transactions costs, this market is better suited for 
speculation than the forward inarket." On the other hand, it has certain disadvantages, 
which makes it less convenient for hedgers, notably the limited number of expiry dates 
for futures contracts and the fixed size of the contracts. Therefore, the market share of 
hedgers in this market can be expected to be smaller. Insofar as the futures market is 
used for hedging purposes, the effects are not much different from the case in which 
a forward contract was used. The counterparty to the forward deal may hedge its 
position in the forward market or in the swap and spot market. This would trigger 
further transactions, as has been explained above, and ultimately result in a short-term 
capital flow. 
3 . 1 .2.4. Hedging in the option market 
The connection between derivative and the underlying cash market is not as close 
for options as for forwards. Open options positions are also routinely covered, but not 
100 percent, since it is not known whether the option will be exercised or not (BIS 
(1986)). Therefore, only a proportion which is given by the 'delta' of an option will 
be hedged. For an option "close at the money' this is about 50 percent. The covering 
of an open option position can be brought about by spot purchases and sales, the net 
amount at the end of the day being swapped (thus creating a forward position) or by 
forward/futures transactions. In both cases, there will be repercussions in the credit 
markets in both countries, just as described above for forward and swap transactions. 
Therefore, the use of options for hedging purposes will also become visible in the 
short-term capital account, but not to the same extent as hedging operations via the 
forward market. 
3 . 1 .2.5. Derivatives markets and money markets 
On a micro level, transactions with derivatives may be considered as a substitute 
for money market transactions. On a macro level, they have to be interpreted as a 
means to gain cheaper (indirect) access to the money markets. As Niehans has pointed 
out with respect to forward transactions: "By and large, forward markets are important 
$6 See FJightiLee-Swan (1988), p. 94. For detailed descriptions of the futures market see Grabbe 
(1991) and Giddy (1994). 
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for the banker and businessman, whose job it is to shave a few pennies from the costs 
of every transaction, thereby increasing the efficiency of the economy." (Niehans 
(1984), p. 154).Fund managers prefer to use derivatives in order to change the risk 
profile of their portfolios because this is cheaper than the use of the cash markets 
(Davis (1991), pp. 36 and 44, Levich (1988), p. 23, l.P.Morgan (1991), p. 8). This 
reduction in costs allows a fine tuning of asset/liability management (Dufey/Giddy 
(1994), p. 226). As the EMS crisis shows, derivatives may also reduce the costs of 
carrying out speculation. However, keeping the statement by Niehans in mind, the cost 
reduction is probably trivial for a small number of trades. Consequently, it should 
hardly matter for a speculator with firm expectations who wants to build up a 
speculative position. The effect of the spread of derivatives on the volume of 
speculative transactions should, therefore, not be overestimated (Stambaugh (1994» . 
Furthennore, a look at turnover in derivatives markets suggests that interest rate 
risk is much more important for most market participants than exchange rate risk. The 
amount of interest rate swaps, futures and options is a multiple of currency swaps, 
options and futures (see Table 6). 
Table 6 Derivatives Contracts 
Instrument 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Over the counter swaps 
Interest 628,9 1010 2 1502,6 23 1 1  ,5 3065 1 3850,8 6177,3 
Currency 183,7 319,6 449 1 577,5 807 2 860 4 899,6 
Exchan.ee traded futures and o� tions 
Interest 610 3 1 174,6 1588,5 2053,6 3229,7 4287,6 7322,8 
Currency 73,6 59,6 65,7 72,4 79 0 104,6 1 10 9  
Notional principal outstanding at end-year, in billions of US dollars 
Source: BIS, International Banking, p. 24 (November 1994). 
3.2. International financial intermediation: gross flows without net flows 
Economic agents do not necessarily have to take on exchange rate risk in order 
to carry out international financial transactions. If foreign currency investments are 
fully hedged there is no exchange rate risk for them. Therefore, foreign currency 
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transactions do not necessarily require a particular view on exchange rates. 51 
Intermediation, interest rate arbitrage and interest rate speculation seem to be the 
common themes in a wide variaty of international transactions. As will be shown, such 
activities, when undertaken in an international context, influence the shape of the 
balance of payments, particularly the structure of the capital account. This is, for 
instance, the case when economic agents borrow short and lend long in foreign 
currency. Such a transaction consists of two flows in opposite directions so that no net 
flow of funds takes place. 
Figure 4 International Intermediation 
Country A 
Rest of the World 
n Direction of 
� Capital Flow 
Maturity 
The factors which can account for international differences in the (autarky) 
slopes of yield curves are risk aversion (liquidity preference) and the efficiency of 
intermediation (Kindleberger (1976), Niehans (1986)). Risk aversion determines the 
composition of asset supplies as well as the structure of asset demand. Thus, 
Kindleberger argues that the comparatively low volume of German long-term outflows 
in the 1970s was partly due to an unusual high liquidity preference of German 
investors. The efficiency of intermediation determines by how much the risk premium 
on long-term (illiquid) assets is reduced. This factor may be even more important than 
risk aversion in explaining the pattern of two-way flows (Niehans (1986), p. 162) and 
S7 In an indirect way exchange rates may be important because expected exchange rate changes affect 
interest rates. 
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it has been used, i.a., to explain the structure of Japan's capital account (Tavlas/Ozeki 
(1992» . In addition, monetary policy can be an important factor. Kindleberger (1976) 
and Engels (1979) have argued that the Bundesbank's policy of buying only short-term 
assets has contributed to a rather steep yield curve in Germany which led to short-term 
outflows and long-term inflows in the 1970s." 
Figure 4 illustrates a situation where average returns are the same in different 
countries but where the (autarky) slope of the yield curve differs." In such a situation, 
there will be two-way flows of capital between different countries but no net flows. 
Residents of country A export short-term capital to the rest of the world and import 
long-term capital. They can be said to receive intermediation services from the rest of 
the world. 'This affects the slope of the yield curve in country A which becomes flatter 
once capital mobility is allowed for. If country A is small, the yield curve in the rest 
of the world will not be affected - otherwise it will become steeper. 
If net flows are zero, gross flows do not create open positions in the aggregate. 
Still, individual market participants may incur exchange rate risk. The question whether 
and to what extent international intermediation requires economic agents to hold open 
fx positions is not analysed by Kindleberger and Niehans. Niehans assumes that both 
countries share the same currency. If assets in country A and in the rest of the world 
are perfect substitutes, that is, if they share the same risk-return characteristics, then 
the two yield curves would be exactely equalized Gust like the relative price of two 
goods is equalized in the standard model of international trade; Niehans (1986)). 
Kindleberger does not address the problem explicitly. He seems to assume, however, 
that investors and debtors are holding open fx positions. In this case, the equalization 
of interest rates could still be brought about if investors and debtors were risk-neutral. 
Short-term capital would flow from country A to the rest of the world and long-term 
capital in the opposite direction until the slopes were equal." 
However, even if economic agents were not prepared to shoulder any exchange 
rate risk the equation of interest rates would still be possible. If transactions costs were 
zero in forward markets and if there were perfect arbitrage over the whole time 
$I �Kindleberger-Salant-Effect· as it has been dubbed by Engels (1979), p.97. 
,." This figure is a modified version of the one KindJeberger uses to analyse Germany's capital flows 
in Ihe 1970.. See Kindleberger (1976), p. 141. See also Niehans (1986) who shows thaI the exchange of 
capital can be analysed in nearly exactly the same way as the exchange of goods. 
«I If these floW'S were, for instance, denominated in foreign currencies, country A residents would hold 
net short-term fx assets and net long-term fx liabilities. While the aggregate foreign currency position 
woutd be zero, individual agents would still be exposed to currency risk. 
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spectrum of forward transactions, hedging would be costless for short as well as for 
long maturities.6\ As long as net flows are zero, the demand for forward foreign 
exchange of long-term borrowers would be exactly matched by the supply of forward 
foreign exchange by short-term lenders. In this case, there would be long-term and 
short-term flows in opposite directions - both fully covered in the forward market. 
In the cases discussed so far, international intermediation is the in4irect effect 
of the transactions of market participants at both ends of the maturity spectrum. But 
intermediation can, of course, also be brought about directly by market participants 
who are prepared to borrow short and lend long. If "borrowing short and lending long" 
can still be considered the characteristic business of a bank, the equalization of interest 
rates can also be brought about by international banking. Borrowing short and lending 
long in a foreign currency does not presuppose open foreign exchange positions. The 
internationalisation of banking has therefore contributed to the increase in gross flows 
and a reduction in interest rate differentials. Furthermore, financing long-term foreign 
assets with short-term foreign loans has not been confined to banks. Many institutional 
investors have pursued the same strategy (furner (1991), p. 72).62 Equalization of 
interest rates requires, however, that banks and institutional investors be prepared to 
commit sufficiently large amounts of capital to intermediation in foreign countries. 
A special form of "intermediation" is interest rate speculation. Rather than 
speculating on exchange rate changes, many investors prefer to speculate on interest 
rate changes. For instance, a major portion of the large long-term inflows (and short­
term outflows) into Spain or Germany after the EMS crisis have been due to interest 
rate speCUlation. Technically, this is not much different from intermediation in the 
narrow sense. It also consists of borrowing short and lending long (or the other way 
round)." The expected return depends mostly on expected price changes of long-term 
assets and not so much on the interest rate differential between short-term and long­
term instruments. An interest rate speculator may even borrow short-term and lend 
long-term when short-term rates are higher than long-term rates ( "negative carry").  
6 1  Perfect arbitrage in the forward market requires the absence of basis risk or risk neutrality of the 
forward market arbitrageurs. Evidently, this is not the case in practice. However, forward rate 
arbitrageurs will be prepared to take over some of the basis risk from hedgers (see paragraphs below). 
ta This does not apply to all institutional investors. Some of them try to avoid interest rate risk as much 
as possible. As Davis (1988), pp. 83-84 found out,duration matching was an important goal of many US 
institutional investors. 
6) A technique widely used recently is to finance the purchase of a bond with a repo. This is basically 
equal to the purchase of a bond which is financed by a shorHerm credit. Such a transaction constitutes a 
long position in bonds. A short position can be constructed if the party in a repo transaction which 
"borrows" the bond sells it to a third party. 
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Speculation on interest rate dijferenliais is another form of maturity 
transformation. It takes place in the forward foreign exchange market. Unfortunately, 
it is hard to document statistically . "Speculation on interest rate differentials via the 
forward foreign exchange market is a little understood but far more important activity 
than is generally realized." (Burnham (1991), p. 130)." This kind of speculation, 
which is also known as "forward rate arbitrage" ("Terminkursarbitrage") has much in 
common with "carrying-charge" or "arbitrage hedging" on commodities exchanges 
(Goss/Yamey (1978), p. 20). Apparently, it has been introduced to the foreign 
exchange market by traders from commodity houses (Andrews (1984), p. 40, fn. 5). 
Forward rate arbitrage is based on the comparison of forward or swap rates for 
different maturities (say one month, two months . . . .  ). Under the assumption that interest 
rate differentials between different currencies are fairly stable, market participants will 
try to exploit jumps in the rate structure." If, for instance, the discount on the two 
months' dollar is far higher than twice the discount on the one month dollar, then it may 
pay to sell one month dollars and buy two months dollars. Unless the one month 
discount increases strongly, this transaction will yield a profit. The whole transaction 
is brought about with swaps and hardly any capital is employed." 
Forward rate arbitrage directly affects the foreign exchange swap market. 
However, indirectly, the capital balance will be influenced. When there is a 
simultaneous purchase and sale of swaps with different maturities, short-term capital 
flows in both directions will be induced. In the example above, one month capital will 
flow from the U.S .• to Germany and two months capital from Germany to the U.S . .  
Thus forward rate arbitrage influences the structure of interest rates in both countries 
aod increases gross capital flows. Furthermore, the presence of arbitrageurs/speculators 
in the forward market which are prepared to take on basis risk is the precondition for 
twcrway flows which even out those international differences in the structure of interest 
rates which are due to preferences and the efficiency of intermediation. 
Gross flows without net flows are also recorded in the balance of payments 
statistics when foreigners shift between long-term and short-term assets. For instance, 
a sale of a bond by a foreigner who holds the proceeds in an account of a local bank 
would be recorded in the balance of payments statistics as a long-term capital export 
6t 1bese activities are reported in various descriptions of the foreign exchange market. See for instance 
Fischer-Erlach (1991), pp. 76-78 and Bmwn (1983), pp. 26·27. 
60S When asked about their approach to foreign exchange trading 43 percent of the banks and securities 
houses questioned ranked -take mismatch gaps based on expected interest rate movements- first. Group 
of Thirty (1985), p. 20. 
66 For details see Fischer-Erlach (1991), pp. 76-78. 
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and a short-tenn capital import (Ito (1994), p. 38). While such activities hardly qualify 
as intennediation, they also affect the yield curve and account for long-term and short­
term capital flows in opposite directions. 
So far, the only derivatives market which has been included in the discussion of 
gross flows is the forward market for foreign exchange. Of course, some of the 
transactions described above could also be brought about using other derivatives. For 
instance, interest rate speculation can also take place in the futures market. However, 
as the discussion in the chapter about hedging has shown, derivatives markets are 
closely connected with cash markets and any net demand in derivatives markets will 
translate into a net demand in cash markets. Therefore, foreign engagements in the 
futures markets are likely to have the same effects on capital flows as the corresponding 
engagement in cash markets. 
In many cases, international intermediation does not involve any cross-border 
transactions. The apparent international activity which is reported in the statistics is not 
affecting the foreign exchange markets. Exchange rates are neither directly influenced 
nor are exchange rate changes the cause of these transactions. Concern about the large 
exchange rate fluctuations sometimes obscures the fact that. for many players in 
international financial markets. interest rates seem to be much more important than 
exchange rates. " . . .  given that most businesses and financial institutions in the large, 
less open economies are inherently more exposed to interest rate risk than exchange rate 
risk, . . .  , it should not be surprising that for most currencies the interest rate swap 
market has grown substantially larger than the currency swap market." (J.P.Morgan 
(1991), 6). 
As far as hedging of fx assets and liabilities is concerned (as opposed to hedging 
in international trade) it is hard to draw the line between international intermediation 
and hedging. If a Japanese pension funds buys US government bonds and hedges SO 
percent of the exchange rate risk it can also be said to be engaged in international 
maturity transformation. This is directly evident when the hedge is a money market 
hedge. In this case, SO percent of the bond purchase is simply financed with a short­
tenn credit. Indirectly, a forward sale of dollars would equally increase the demand for 
short-term dollar credits because the counterparty in the forward transaction would 
export short-term capital from the U.S. to Japan in order to cover its open forward 
position. However, the determinants of intermediation and (partly) hedged foreign 
investment are different. Intermediation is a function of the difference between long­
term and short-term interest rates in foreign countries. Foreign investment which is 
partly or totally hedged depends on expected differences in foreign and local yields. 
And whereas foreign investment involves net flows of capital, international 
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intermediation only affects gross flows. Whatever the precise definitions, both kinds 
of activities can help to explain the observed negative correlation between short-term 
and long-term capital movements. 
In an empirical analysis, Golup (1990) found that gross financial flows between 
countries were still small compared to financial flows within countries. But he could 
also show that their relative size had been rising between 1970 and 1986. This rise 
gathered speed in the early 199Os. International financial intermediation - including 
interest rate speCUlation - has been vastly increasing in the 199Os, as witnessed by the 
spectacular rise in two-way flows in many countries. These large two-way flows usually 
involved long-term and short-term capital flows in opposite directions. 
3.3. Hedging and Intermediation: some empirical evidence 
Given that hedging does not produce a clear pattern of long-term and short-term 
capital movements, it is hard to account empirically for the influence of hedging on the 
structure of capital flows. Yet, if it is assumed that the hedging behaviour of market 
participants is, at least for certain periods, fairly stable, a negative correlation could 
be expected between: 
- short-term and long-term capital flows and 
- accumulated short-term and long-term capital flows (or stocks). 
Such a pattern is even more likely to emerge when international intermediation is 
quantitatively significant. The proposed link between long-term and short-term capital 
movements can be easily tested. 
To test the relationship between long-term and short-term capital movements a 
simple regression has been employed: 
S-T = .. + a,L-T + E 
where S-T are private-sector short-term capital flows and L-T are private-sector 
long-term flows. 
As Table 7 shows, all the coefficients have the right sign, showing a negative 
correlation between long-term and short-term capital movements. As indicated by the 
t-values this relationship is quite robust. All coefficients are significant - at the five 
percent level - except in the case of the United States for the period from 1970 to 1994. 
Thus, for all countries there seems to be a robust negative correlation between long­
term and short-term capital movements. Only in the United States, for the period as a 
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whole, is there hardly any correlation between long-term and short-term capital 
movements, and for the perind from 1983-1994 there is only a small negative 
correlation. This result may reflect the role of the US dollar as a "world currency" ,  
which has heen diminishing somewhat since the seventies. The results also show that 
the correlation has become closer for the sub-period from 1983 to 1994. This is likely 
to be the result of the growing volume of international intermediation and interest rate 
speculation. 
Table 7 Tbe Correlation Between Private Short-term Long·term Capital Flows" 
1970-1994 
X-Coeff. 
Australia -0 295 
Canada -0,539 
France . -0,785 
Germany·· -0,567 
Italy -0,439 
Japan -0,731 
Netherl. -0,849 
Spain- -0,554 
U.K. -1 ,008 
U.S. -0,129 
�uarterly data 
Source: IMF (b) 
• First three columns: 1973-1994. 
- First three columns: 1971-1994 . 
••• First three columns: 1975-1994. 
1983-1994 
X-Coeff. 
-0,497 
-0,691 
-0,798 
-0,573 
-0 444 
-0,985 
-0,902 
-0 568 
- 1 ,016 
-0,392 
All coefficients (except U.S. 1970-1994) are significant at the 5 percent level. 
If net flows accumulate over time, increasing the value of net foreign assets and 
liabilities, there should also be movements in opposite directions of accumulated long­
term and short- term capital flows if both outflows and inflows are hedged to the same 
extent. To test this proposition, the relationship between private short-term and long­
term non-equity flows has heen analysed for ten countries' (see appendix). Looking at 
the 1994 net stocks of foreign assets and liabilities (approximated by accumulated 
flows), these countries can be divided into creditor and debtor countries. The capital 
61 Excluding official capital movements. 
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side of the three creditor countries shows different patterns. Only for Japan do 
accumulated short-tenn and long-term capital movements have an opposite sign. Until 
1989, Japan accumulated current account surpluses and net short-term liabilities and 
experienced long-term capital outflows. However, since 1990 the net short-term debt 
has been reduced and in 1994 Japan became a short-term creditor, while net long-term 
capital exports were still growing (see case study Japan). The Netherlands, with an 
accumulated current account surplus of around US$ 90 bn., experienced steady 
outflows of direct investment and official capital and, since the early 199Os, of portfolio 
equity capital. Accumulated short-term capital flows remained close to zero, however. 
Until 1990 the counterpart to German capital account surpluses were outflows of 
official and private long-term and short-term capital. So, in this case, short-term and 
long-term capital movements went in the same direction. However, the declining net 
foreign credit position after German Unification has been accompanied by huge inflows 
into German bonds and outflows of short-term and portfolio equity capital. Thus, at 
least since the early 1990s, accumulated short-term and long-term flows were partly 
offsetting each other. 
Similarly, differences can be observed for the debtor countries. Until 1992 
Spanish inflows of equity capital more than matched the current account deficits. 
Canadian deficits were mostly financed by bonds sales, Australian and Italian deficits 
by other long-term capital flows. However, only in the case of Canada, were these 
accumulating long-term inflows partly matched by short-term outflows. The situation 
in the U.K. differs somewhat from the other debtor countries because the U.K. 
experienced a current account deficit and net long-term capital outflows which were 
matched by huge short-term capital inflows. So, while accumulated long-term and 
short-tenn capital movements went, indeed, in opposite directions, accumulated short­
term capital movements were even larger than accumulated long-term movements. Still, 
together with Canada, the U.K. provides a second example for accumulated capital 
flows in different directions. 
On the whole, stock figures provide only limited evidence of hedging and 
intennediation. However, the negative relationship between accumulated long-term and 
short-term capital flows seems to have become stronger in the eary 199Os. Better results 
are obtained in the flow analysis. There is, indeed, a negative correlation between 
short-term and long-term capital flows. The correlation coefficient provides information 
as to the degree to which long-term and short-term capital flows are offsetting each 
other. This shows that it is not possible to interpret both flows independently of each 
other. The theoretical arguments presented above suggest that this negative correlation 
is due (partially) to hedging of long-term capital flows and intermediation. 
Unfortunately, this does not imply that the remaining capital flows are due to 
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speculation. As has been shown, variable hedging of stocks can cause short-term capital 
movements which are not related to long-term flows. 
3.4. Estimating speculation: What has been learned, so far? 
The starting point of the analysis has been the definition of fx speculation as a 
transaction, the return on which depends significantly on expected exchange rate 
changes. As has been shown, such speculative transactions are likely to be carried out 
with fx derivatives or short-term instruments whose interest or price risk is low. This 
points to short-term capital movements as a possible indicator of fx speculation because 
transactions in fx derivatives also affect the balance on short-term capital. However, 
net short-term capital movements do not necessarily reflect speculative behaviour. They 
can also be due to other types of transactions: 
a. International intermediation 
In this case there are offsetting long-term and short-term capital movements in the 
opposite direction. Therefore, no open positions are created and no exchange rate risk 
is involved. Because international intermediation tightly links short-term and long-term 
capital flows it is fairly easy to spot when undertaken on a larger scale. 
b. Hedging of long-term capital flows 
In principle, hedging of long-term flows should also produce a pattern of long-term and 
short-term capital movements flowing in opposite directions. Unlike in the case of 
international intermediation these flows do not have to be equal in size. If hedging is 
not complete, long-term flows should be larger. Furthermore, once it is taken into 
account that hedge ratios may be different for locals and foreigners and that they may 
change over time, it becomes clear that hedging may be difficult to detect. 
c. Hedging of stocks 
If investors change the hedge ratio of stocks, they may trigger net short-term capital 
flows which are larger than long-term capital flows and which are difficult to seperate 
from speculation. 
Given that hedging can produce almost any pattern of short-term capital flows, 
it seems questionable whether an analysis of short-term capital flows can provide 
information about speculation. However, if the short-term capital account is further 
disaggregated and if it is taken into account that certain transactions will nearly always 
be hedged and others not at all, it becomes possible to discriminate to a certain extent 
between hedging and speculation. 
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The balance on current account can be used as a starting point because it shows 
to what extent private and public investors (incl. central bank) were prepared to hold 
open fx positions. In order to measure the fx transactions of private investors, it has to 
be analysed in a second step how much of current account balances are financed by 
official capital flows and reserves. Third, transactions such as foreign direct investment 
(and portfolio equity investment) which are not exposed to a large degree to exchange 
rate risk and which are usually not (or little) hedged can also be subtracted. Fourth, 
short-term capital movements of banks can usually be interpreted as fully hedged." 
Therefore, net short-term banking flows have to be traced back to long-term flows of 
banks, hedging activities or speculation of other market participants." If short-term 
capital flows of banks and long-term flows (especially bonds and credits) of non-banks 
flow in opposite directions, this can be taken as an indicator of hedging. To the extent 
that short-term capital movements of banks cannot be explained in this way, it has to 
be considered whether it is plausible that the hedging of stocks has changed. Events 
such as the EMS crisis or the trade conflict between the U.S. and Japan which involved 
the attempt by the U.S. administration to "talk down the dollar" make it possible to 
infer which positions were increasingly hedged. In addition, exchange rate 
developments can also be taken into account. If it is not possible to "explain" short-term 
movements of banks in this way they may, indeed, reflect speCUlative activities of other 
market participants. 
4. Case Studies 
For the case studies two countries belonging to different exchange rate systems 
have been selected. Spain, which belongs to a system of fixed exchange rates, has been 
forced to devalue during the EMS crisis. It will be analysed whether this was, indeed, 
due to speculative attacks. The Japanese Yen floats vis-a-vis the other major currencies. 
Furthermore, Japan has been by far the world's largest capital exporter during the last 
10-15 years. Since speculation has something to do with open position taking, Japan 
seems to warrant a closer look. 
(II Even during the EMS crisis,banks have not been among the active speculators. See Garberrraylor 
(1995), p. 175. 
$) At this point, it is important to include local foreign currency positions in the analysis, because local 
investors may finance part of their foreign currency invesunents with fx credits from local banks. 
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4 . 1 .  Spain during the EMS crisis and after 
A look at the accumulated figures of Spain's balance of payments shows that 
until 1992 the current account deficit was financed by long-term capital imports -
mostly direct investments.'" Since net capital imports in the second half of the 1 980s 
were much higher than the current account deficits, the central bank had to buy 
relatively large amounts of foreign exchange and the foreign reserves rose 
considerably.7I The increase of foreign liabilities between 1983 and 1990 consisted 
largely of direct and portfolio equity investments. These investments are not exposed 
as much to exchange rate risk as assets whose value is fixed in nominal peseta terms. 
However, from late 1990 to early 1992 net bond purchases and long-term credits 
increased considerably. Within six quarters foreigners purchased about US$ 20 bn. 
Figure 5 Accumulated Capital Flows 
US-$ bn . .. ����----------------------------------------�� 
� 011. Capital 
-+- Curran' Ace. 
Source: IMF 
- Boner. 
+ Por t I. Equ, 
Ot"., L-T 
·0 Olt.cl l .....  
10 According to stock figures calculated by the Banco de Espana net liabilities of Spanish residents 
(excl. the Banoo de Espana) rose by 1'1a. 1 1200 bn. (from Pta. 4477 bn. in 1983 to Pta. 15497 bn. in 1991 
- eoo of period figures). Net fx liabilities rose by 1382 bn., net equity liabilities by 6219 bn. and net Pta. 
liabilities by Pta. l418 bn. In the same period reserves increased by Pta. 5485 bn. whic!J. is about equal 
to half of the increase of net foreign liabilities of Spanish residents. Source: Banco de Espana (1994b); own 
calculations. 
11 A detailed analysis of Spain's balance of payments in this period can be found in 
Ortega/SalavarrCa/Viflals (1990) and OIuhosch/Krfiger (1991). 
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worth of Spanish bonds (Det) and supplied (net) long-term credits of around US$ 15 bn. 
These capital inflows seem to have been mostly unhedged. since the short-term capital 
account did not display any offsetting outflows. n Thus, exposure to exchange rate risk 
increased considerably during the two years before the outbreak of the EMS crisis. 
4. 1 . 1 .  Spain during the EMS crisis 
Looking at the capital flows and the changes in official reserves, the effects of 
the EMS crisis appear to be quite impressive. After steady increases in the first half of 
1992 and relatively small losses in July and August, international reserves declined by 
nearly Pta. 2.6 tell. in September (balance of payments data) which equals about one 
third of the stock in August. This decline was due to a sharp turn in the capital balance. 
From September to November there was a net capital outflow of Pta. 2. 1 tT11. (if 
"errors and omissions" are included the outflow was even higher). However, given the 
size of the gross or net stock of foreign liabilities these numbers are not that impressive 
at all. 
Figure 6 Capital Movements and Changes in Reserves in 1992 
1000 �":':':.:. '::":.:. --------------------, 1000 
• • • 
" 
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Source: Banco de Espafla 
" 11 12 
n lnsofar as investors outside of the EU purchased these bonds they may have hedged the currtmcy risk 
by selling DM forward. This strategy was based on the assumption, that there would be: no revaluations 
before the transition to European Monetary Union. Th� transactions have been labelled "convergence 
play" (Goldstein el al. (1993). p. 8-10). 
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Table 8 Foreign Currency Positions" 
Gross Position Net Position 
Stock For. Loc. Pta. For. Equ. 
s* Fx L Fx L L·· Fx L 
12/91 -9955 -2914 -4567 -5188 -7783 
8/92 -12134 -4828 -7000 -8429 
9/92 -13042 -4564 -6893 -8410 
1 0/92 -13972 -41 1 3  -7570 -8296 
1 1/92 -143 1 9  -4045 -71 1 1  -8359 
12/92 -14593 -4002 -4275 -7292 -8621 
Stock chan£es 
1 992 -4638 -1088 292 -2104 -838 
Sept. -908 265 106 + 19 
Oct. -931 451 -677 + 1 14 
Nov. -346 68 458 -63 
Dec. -274 -230 -180 -262 
9- 12 -2459 553 -292 -192 
9-1 1  -2185 783 - I I I  70 
* end of period *. excluding equity 
Pta. 
L·· 
-37 1 1  
-3303 
-2793 
-2479 
-2066 
-2083 
1628 
510 
3 1 4  
413 
-17 
1 220 
1237 
Flows 
C
!f
. 
B . 
-633 
1035 
I I I  
974 
-594 
1526 
2 1 19 
For.Fx L = Foreign Currency Liabilities of Spanish Residents 
Loc.Fx L = Local Foreign Currrency Liabilities 
Pta. L = Foreign Pta.-denominated liabilities of Spanish residents 
Equ. = Investment in equity (incl. portfolio equity) 
Pta. bn. 
Er. Res. 
Om. 
608 -1778 
158 -1270 
223 -236 
1 1 6  -1069 
-418 418  
389 -2157 
329 -2575 
Source: Banco de Espana: ( l994b) for 'Loc.Fx L' and Boletin Estadistico for other 
items; own calculations.'4 
7) The last item gives the changes in official reserves. The other items are excluding reserves and 
changes in reserves. AU liabilities are minus (assets plus). Increases in liabilities (including flow figures ) 
are minus (increases in assets plus). 
7<t 1be Banco de Espai\a provides monthly information on foreign assets and liabilities up to December 
1992 in the BoletIn Estadlstico. These figures do not exactly match the annual figures provided in the 
Cuentas Financieras (Banco de Espana (l994b». 
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At the end of 1991 gross foreign fx liabilities" of Spanish residents amounted 
to Pta. 10 trll. and gross local fx liabilities to Pta. 3 trll. (see Table S). Thus, total gross 
fx liabilities amounted to about Pta. 1 3  trll. This figure rose until the end of August 
1992 to about Pta. 15 trll. (using the end 1991 figures to approximate the amount of 
local fx liabilities). These Pta. 15 trl!. can be interpreted as the upper bound of hedging 
requirements of Spanish residents at the outbreak of the EMS crisis. However, gross 
figures may exaggerate the hedging requirement somewhat, since fx assets may be used 
to offset fx liabilities. Looking at net figures, the local fx position is, of course, zero. 
Net foreign fx liabilities, on the other hand, amounted to Pta. 5 trll. at the end of 1991 
and rose by approximately Pta. 2 trll. to Pta. 7 trll. By the end of August." The net 
figures can be seen as the lower bound of the hedging requirements of Spanish 
residents. But since fx assets and liabilities are not spread evenly over residents, the 
effective fx exposure which had to be hedged was probably much higher. 
Gross Pta. assets of foreigners stood at Pta. 4.6 trll. at the end of 1991 and rose 
to Pta. 4.S trll. by August 1992. The net assets amounted to Pta. 3.7 trl!. in December 
1991 and Pta. 3.3 trll. in August 1992. 
If the gross fx liabilities of Spanish residents plus the gross Pta. assets of 
foreigners can be interpreted as the possible maximum of exchange rate exposure and 
the corresponding amount of net fx and Pta. positions as the minimum of exchange rate 
exposure, the possible hedging requirement lay between Pta. 10 and 20 trll. or between 
US$ 90 and ISO bn. In order to avoid exchange rate losses the holders of these 
positions either could have reduced their positions by selling Pta. assetsn and repaying 
their fx debts or they could have hedged. The first possibility would have become 
visible in a reduction of fx liabilities of Spanish residents and Pta. assets of foreigners. 
The second possibility, hedging, would mainly have become visible in banks' short­
term capital movements because for most market participants it is cheaper to hedge with 
derivatives than to perform a money market hedge (compare paragraph 3 . 1 .2.). If other 
market participants are shortening the Peseta in the derivatives markets they will induce 
15 In the follOwing, a few technical terms will be used which are taken from the SIS: "foreign fx 
liabilities" ("assets") are liabilities (assets) against foreigners, -foreign fx liabilities" ("assets") are 
liabilities (assets) against foreigners in foreign currency, "foreign Pta. liabilities" ("assets") are liabilities 
(assets) against foreigners in Pta., "local fx liabilities" ("assets") are liabilities (assets) against residents 
in foreign currency. 
76 After a further liberalisation of short-term capital transactions in February 1992, fx borrowing by 
Spanish residents increased considerably, reaching Pta. �91 bn. in the first 7 months of 1992. See Banco 
de Espana (19930), pp. 30-31 .  
77 This would have driven up interest rates and depressed asset prices. For holders of assets with 
variable prices, especially fixed interest assets, the expected exchange rate losses would have translated 
into asset price losses. 
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short-tenn capital exports from Spanish banks. A look at Spain's balance of payments 
clearly shows extreme changes in the capital balance in the swomer of 1992. After six 
months of net inflows the capital balance was close to zero in July and there was a 
small outflow in August. Afterwards, high deficits appeared. These deficits were 
mainly due to short-tenn capital exports of banks and, to a minor extent, to the sale of 
bonds by foreigners. In the perind from September to November 1992 when the net 
capital outflow amounted to Pta. 2 1 19 bn. banks exported Pta. 1541 bn. of short-tenn 
capital (net) and there was a net outflow in bonds of Pta. 369 bn. (mostly sales of 
Spanish bonds by foreigners). The huge amount of capital exports forced the Banco de 
Espana to intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets. According to the balance of 
payments statistics, the Banco de Espaiia sold Pta. 1270 bn. worth of foreign exchange 
in September, Pta. 236 bn. in October and 1069 bn. in November. For the three 
months as a whole reserve losses amounted to Pta. 2575 bn. 
As impressive as these flows are, they are clearly much too small to cover the 
open fx positions of Pta. 10 to 20 trl!. which existed in August 1992. If these figures 
were true, open positions of Pta. 10 trll. or more would have been closed only to a 
small degree (1 .3 trll. in September and another 1 . 3  trl!. in the next two months). 
Given that some of the transactions were speculative, the remaining open positions 
would have been even larger. However, tltis may be due to the fact that the recorded 
monthly figures understate the amount of capital exports which took place during the 
days before the depreciations of the Pta. on September 17 and November 22. It is 
quite likely that many speculators and hedgers unwound their short Pta. positions right 
after the two devaluations, thus partly reversing the capital outflows that took place 
before the devaluations. Therefore, the end-<>f-the-month September and November 
figures are probably understating the maximum amount of reserve losses (and the 
corresponding capital flows) by a wide margin. The true amount of reserve losses can 
only be guessed because the intra-month figures are not published. 
The monthly balance of payments figures are providing - at best - a minimum 
estimate of the true amount of intervention right before the two devaluations in 
September and November. The stock of operational reserves (total reserves minus 
gold and SDR's) of the Banco de Espana can be used as a plausible maximum 
estimate. Given the size of fx reserves and the rather short periods of speculative 
attacks before the two devaluations it is fairly safe to assume that operational reserves 
were above zero throughout the EMS crisis. At the end of August, operational 
reserves stood at around Pta. 6.6 trll. and at the end of October at approximately Pta. 
5.3 trll. These figures can be interpreted as the upper bound of interventions. Thus, 
the foreign exchange intervention of the Banco de Espana lay between Pta. 2.6 and 
6.6 trll. in September and between Pta. 2. 1 and 5.3 trl!. in November. However, 
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there were open fx positions between Pta. 10 and 20 trll. in September and between 
Pta. 9 and 20 trll. in November which were exposed to the risk of a Pta. depreciation. 
So, even if the minimum hedging requirement and the maximum estimation of 
intervention were in fact the correct estimates, interventions would not have been 
enough to cover all exposed positions. This indicates that there must have been high 
foreign exchange losses for foreigners who were long in Pesetas and Spanish residents 
who were short in fx. It can further be concluded that a run on a central bank does not 
require speculators a la Soros. It is suffices that there has been a gradual build up of 
open fx positions. As the numbers above show, the pressure on the Banco de Espana 
would have been much larger if 50 percent or an even higher proportion of investors 
had tried to close their positions. In this case, the excess supply of Pesetas (excess 
demand for fx) might well have gone as high as Pta. 10 trll. or more. 
In a way, these large figures are the result of the success of the EMS in the late 
1980s and early 1990s up to the Danish referendum. Market participants had put more 
and more faith into the stability of exchange rates during this perind.78 No matter 
whether investors (debtors) found the risk/reward relationship in high (low) yielding 
currencies more and more favourable as the EMS seemed to be heading towards a 
single currency, whether they thought that central banks would allow a cheap exit in 
case of emergency or whether they were simply unaware of .the exchange rate risk 
they were running (like - possibly - a large number of Italian mortgage holders 79), 
Spanish residents increased their fx borrowing and foreigners their Pta. lending. 
Consequently the stock of fx assets and liabilities rose to ever higher levels. These 
.buge open positions, while giving evidence of the success of the EMS, at the same 
time proved to be its greatest weakness once doubts about the viability of the system 
spread. The amount of open positions which required hedging was probably much 
more than speculators could put up, especially when it is taken into account that not 
only the Peseta was attacked. Unfortunately, the estimates given above say little about 
the proportion of speculators and hedgers. Short-term outflows by banks can have 
been caused by both groups. Still, given the size of existing open positions in August 
1992, one cannot help concluding that the role of speculation has been overdone. Of 
course, speculation may have been dominant during certain short periods. However, 
the general force of the attacks aginst the Peseta is likely to stem from hedging 
activities. Speculators were riding on top of a wave of non-speculative transactions 
which were meant to close open positions. The counter hypothesis that most of the 
pressure on exchange rates came from speculation implies that most investors with 
78 Even after the referendum up to early September many market participants seem to have 
believed in the stability of the EMS. For these investors the devaluation of the Italian lira was the 
turning point. See Hansell (1992), p. 33. 
79 See Bisbey (1995). 
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open Pta. positions passively accepted the reduction of their net wealth without trying 
to protect themselves. This is highly unlikely. 
4. 1 .2. Factors influencing fx exposure 
By 1992 Spanish residents had high fx liabilities and the rest of the world had 
huge amounts of Pta. assets. The size of these positions, however, was not solely due 
to market forces. The Banco de Espana and the Spanish public sector were also partly 
responsible for this. The increasing budget deficits80 led to high interest rates; in 
addition, the expectation that Spain would succeed in achieving convergence led to 
expectations of falling interest rates which attracted a lot of foreign capital. Thus, net 
inflows were increased and the stock of Spanish bonds held by foreigners quickly 
grew. The corresponding capital inflows drove up the value of the Peseta and pushed 
it to the upper limit of the EMS band. This created a policy dilemma for the Banco de 
Espaiia. Whereas the exchange rate target required a more expansive monetary policy, 
the relatively high inflation rate required a more restrictive monetary policy. For a 
certain period, the Banco de Espaiia tried to achieve both goals. However, given the 
committment to fixed exchange rates and given that EU rules required further 
libera1ization of capital flows, the Banco de Espaiia's attempts to reduce the inflation 
rate with a policy of "monetary tightening cum capital controls" (Vifials (1990), p. 30) 
were jeopardized due to the lack of improvement in fiscal consolidation. Keeping Pta. 
interest rates high induced foreigners to invest in Spain and Spanish residents to 
borrow in other currencies '! In both cases, the supply of foreign exchange increased 
and the Banco de Espaiia had to buy other currencies in order to prevent a further 
appreciation. Therefore, interest rate policy had only a limited effect on the inflation 
rate, given the difficulties encountered in preventing the money supply from rising. 
This policy resulted in changes in the structure of the Banco de Espaiia' s balance 
sheet. The share of foreign assets rose from 26 percent in 1985 to 53 percent in 199 1 .  
If the effect had only been a change in the structure of the Banco de Espaiia' s 
balance sheet, this would not have been problematic. However, the counterposition to 
a rising net foreign currency position of the Banco de Espaiia were rising fx debts of 
80 Measured in percent of GOP, the public deficit grew from 2.8 to 4.1  percent between 1989 and 
1991. 
81 This does not mean that high central bank interest rates will under any condition lead to a capital 
inflow. If high interest rates go hand in hand with the expectation of high inflation rates or high 
depreciations, then capital may not be attracted at all or flow out - pushing interest rates even higber. 
However, from the moment the Peseta reached the upper limit of the band, inflows could only have 
been prevented by tight capital controls or lower central bank interest rates. In this sense, short-term 
interest rates were "high" and therefore influencing the amount of capital inflows. 
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residents and Pta. assets of foreigners. Spanish firms partly raised credits denominated 
in foreign currency, either directly in foreign markets or through local banks.82 So, 
while the Banco de Espana was amassing foreign reseIVes which by itself looked quite 
reassuring, market participants were shouldering a higher amount of exchange rate 
risk. Once the market's belief in the stability of the currency was shaken, market 
participants came running back to reverse the deal. 83 
If monetary policy had held short-term interest rates lower, residents would 
have borrowed more from the Banco de Espana, fuelling monetary expansion. 
, 
However, this would have been somewhat countered by a reduction of capital inflows 
and exchange rate inteIVentions.84 While more money would have been created by 
lending directly to residents, less money would have been created by buying foreign 
currency. With both capital inflows and central reseIVes (i.e. capital exports of the 
Banco de Espaiia) lower, the real net inflow (the current account deficit) could aiso 
have been the same. At the same tinte Spanish residents and foreigners alike would 
have been less exposed to exchange rate risk. This is not to say that it would have 
been easy for the Banco de Espana to pursue such a policy. The Maastricht treaty 
required inflation convergence and the markets expected the Banco de Espana to be 
tough on inflation. Any softening of monetary policy (lowering of interest rates) could 
have been interpreted as a violation· of the Maastricht treaty and as a shift towards a 
more expansionary policy. So in a way the Banco de Espana was caught in the 
inconsistencies of the Maastricht treaty which presupposes that central banks can 
autonomously set monetary policy even when exchange rates are fixed. To make 
matters worse, fiscal policy increased these problems instead of helping to reduce 
them. 
4.1.3. From net to gross flows 
December 1992 marked the beginning of a development of rising gross flows 
and declining net flows. Even as the EMS crisis boiled on in the first half of 1993, 
82 The banks did not assume fx risks to a large extent. They simply switched part of the 
intennediation into foreign currency. usually covering foreign currency loans with foreign currency 
borrowing. 
83 The problem for market participants was, of course, that they did not own those Pesetas 
anymore. These had found their way into economic circulation raising prices. So, in order to buy the 
foreign exchange back from the Banco de Espana they had to borrow additional Pta. funds from the 
Bank. 
84 If market participants had believed in the coming of a single currency and assessed exchange 
rate risk to be zero (which was not the case, see Ayuso. �rez and Restoy (1994», monetary policy 
would not have been able to influence the money supply. 
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foreigners increasingly engaged in interest rate speculation in Spain.8$ The currency 
crisis had propelled interest rates to high levels and foreign investors expected a sharp 
fall of interest rates in Spain after the end of the crisis. Therefore, they invested heavily 
in Spanish bonds. In contrast to the pre-crisis period this did not, however, lead to net 
capital inflows because investors were no longer prepared to hold an open Pta. position. 
Thus, nearly all the purchases of long-term instruments were financed by short-term 
Pta. credits. This led to a massive increase of capital flows as recorded in the balance 
of payments (see Figure 7 and 8). Net capital flows, on the other hand, became very 
small after the currency tunnoil. On the one hand. this was due to the recession which 
reduced private capital demand. On the other hand, the reassessment of exchange rate 
risk may also have been a contributing factor. Namely, despite high interest rate 
Figure 7 Bond Inflows and Short-term Capital Outflows 
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differentials, foreign investors were not as ready as before the EMS crisis to hold open 
Pta. positions and the willingness of Spanish residents to borrow in foreign currencies 
also subsided. Foreigners bought larger amounts of Spanish bonds than before the crisis 
but they now fully hedged their exchange rate exposure. This increase in long-term 
capital inflows which were financed with short-term Pta. credits caused an increase of 
recorded capital flows. Long-term inflows and short-term outflows reached levels 
which had not been known before the EMS crisis. As Figure 7 shows, on the basis of 
15 Compare Banco de Espana (I994a); Ch. Ill. 
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recorded monthly averages, short-term banking flows even occasionally surpassed those 
in autumn 1992. This figure also shows the strong correlation between short-term bank 
flows and bond flows which emerged in late 1992/early 1993. This close relationship 
is also evidenced in Figure 8 which displays the accumulated monthly figures of foreign 
bonds purchases and sales and short-term bank credit. Both rose, with minor 
interruptions, until early 1994 and declined afterwards. 
Figure 8 Accumulated Bond and Short-term Capital Flows 
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A closer look at the short-term capital flows of banks also reveals the 
significance of repos (inel. "operaciones simultaneas") as a means to finance the 
purchase of Spanish bonds. Within two years, the outstanding amount rose from zero 
in early 1992 to above Pta. 4 trll. in January 1994 (see Figure 9). In early 1994, the 
end of interest rate optimism led to a substantial decline in speculative interest rate 
positions. This shift becomes not only visible in the sharp tum in short-term and long­
term capital flows but also in the volume of transactions in futures and options markets, 
which jumped to new heights in January 1994 (having risen strongly already throughout 
1993), As investors were becoming more pessimistic with respect to interest rates they 
hedged their open interest position in futures markets. 
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Figure 9 The Composition of Banks' Short-term Capital Flows 
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4.1 .4. Interpretation of the results 
Spain provides an example of an economy which experienced both high gross 
and net capital flows. An analysis which incorporates the structure of capital flows, the 
size and the structure of foreign assets and liabilities and the correlation between certain 
items of the capital account shows that these large flows cannot by themselves be 
interpreted as evidence for a high willingness to bear exchange rate risk. Up 10 the late 
1980s, the high net inflows consisted mostly of direct investment and portfolio equity 
capital, which are both less exposed to exchange rate risk. The flows into Spanish 
bonds in the early 1990s, the short-term capital outflows during the EMS crisis and the 
enonnous increase in gross flows after the crisis overstated the willingness of 
international investors to hold open foreign currency positions. The bond inflows were 
based on the premise that there was no longer a currency risk - or that in the event that 
this expectation should not be fulfilled it would be possible to cover open positions 
before the devaluation." This is illustrated by the "convergence play" which took place 
16 Of course, it is not possible for all market partkipants to get out al the same lime. However. 
investors may have been confident that central banks would intervene, thus allowing a custle� exit. This 
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in the early 1990s. Many foreign investors considered the EMS to be more or less a "de 
facto" currency area and hedged their investments in European high interest rate 
countries with short sales of D-Marks. Therefore, the purchases of Spanish bonds 
around 1991 grossly overstated the willingness to hold open Pta. positions because 
many investors hoped that their indirect hedge would be sufficient. Equally, the huge 
outflows of short-term capital cannot be used as an indicator of the amounts of 
speculative capital ready to be employed against the Peseta. While speculation may 
have been important, the amount of short-term outflows also reflected the fact that, 
over the years, large open positions had been built up, which now required hedging. 
The long-term inflows and short-term outflows after the crisis did not involve any 
exchange rate risk taking at all. Purchases of long-term assets were simply financed 
with short-term credits. Thus there may be, at times, large capital flows although 
market participants do not seem to be prepared to shoulder large amounts of exchange 
rate risk. 
It is noteworthy that even during the currency crisis, there were net inflows of 
direct investment and (with the exception of the first quarter of 1994) portfolio equity 
investment. This shows that equity investment is either much less influenced by 
exchange rate considerations than other investments or in fundamentally different ways. 
Thus, there are large segments of the equity market, such as shares of export oriented 
firms, which can hope to benefit from a depreciation." 
Finally, although substitutability of assets in different currencies may still be 
restricted by exchange rate risk; national financial markets are moving closer together. 
This is not only confirmed by tests of covered interest rate parity (cf. Goldstein/Mussa 
(1993), pp. 16-18) but also by the large volume of gross flows, which have risen 
enormously in recent years." Market participants may still be reluctant to run exchange 
rate risks to a greater extent, but they are no longer confined with their activities to 
national markets. Intermediation, arbitrage, hedging and interest speculation are carried 
out in whatever market offers profit opportunities. This implies that financial markets 
expectation proved to be right, so that it was indeed possible for many market participants to close thdr 
positions in time. See Group of Ten (1993), pp. 22-3. 
t7 As Green (1994) noles, equity investors were rewarded for Iheir invesbnents in "weak currency stock 
markets". 1bose who, for example, invested in the Spanish stock market, gained more from rising prices 
than they lost from a falling currency value. 
It Golup (1990) argues that gross flows rather than net flows might be the appropriate indicator of 
capital mobility. He finds that gross flows are still surprisingly small when compared to flows within 
countries. However, as the Spanish experience shows, gross flows have been rising considerably in the 
early 1990:s. Therefore it can be concluded that, based on the gross flow criterium, capital mobility has 
increased significantly. 
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throughout the world will become more similar. Existing differences due to different 
attitudes towards risk, economic theories which are believed or not believed. 
regulations, habits etc. will be evened out. The aftermath of the EMS crisis illustrates 
this point. Foreigners were much more optimistic about interest rate trends and/or more 
prepared to speculate on their beliefs than Spanish or German residents. 
4.2. Hedging, intermediation and currency speculation: Japan' s  capital account 
between 1983 and 1994 
Japan has been by far the largest supplier of capital in world markets. From 
1989 to 1993, 53 percent of world net capital flows came from Japan (IMF (1995), p. 
83). This implies that Japanese, non-Japanese or both must have accumulated large 
open positions over the years. Therefore. the Japanese balance of payments warrants 
a closer look. 
Figure 10 Japan's Balance of Payments 
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The broad development of Japan's balance of payments since the early 1980s is 
well known. From 1983 to 1994 the nominal effective exchange rate of the Japanese 
Yen roughly doubled. In this period, Japan's balance of payments exhibited large 
current account surpluses. The current account surpluses were accompanied by 
corresponding net capital exports and (on average) increases in net foreign reserves. 
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This development is usually analysed from the goods side of the balance of payments. 
Such an analysis implies that capital flows passively adapt to the trade balance. Here, 
the balance of payments will be analysed from the capital side,l9 since a current account 
surplus implies that somebody must be willing to hold an open foreign exchange 
(X>sition. However, such willingness cannot be taken for granted. As will be shown, the 
capital flows of the 1980s and early 1990s between Japan and the rest of the world 
provide an example for hedging, intermediation and - to some extent - speculation. 
Figure 11 International Transactions of Japanese Banks 
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A closer look at the capital account reveals that there was a marked change in 
the structure of capital flows around 1990. Between 1983 and 1990, long-term capital 
exports were usually larger than current account deficits, the difference being made up 
by short-term capital imports. In 1990, this situation changed significantly. The long­
term capital balance turned into surplus, with only occasionai deficits, and the short-
III In Dluhosch/Freytag/Kriiger (forthcoming) it is argued that in a world with capital mobility the 
balarK."C on l."\UTeIlt account should be interpreled as the result of the transactions of international investors. 
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term capital balance turned into deficit. 
The net movements of short-term capital are mainly due to the transactions of 
banks. Therefore, explanations of net short-term capital flows have to focus on the 
determinants of international short-term bank lending and borrowing."' Since the 
foreign currency exposure of Japanese banks is tightly restricted, it can be assumed that 
at the margin foreign currency lending must be financed by foreign currency 
borrowing.91 To the extent that the net short-term capital import reflects foreign 
currency borrowing, it must therefore be offset by foreign currency lending - either to 
foreigners or Japanese residents - or derivatives transactions. One reason for such 
simultaneous foreign currency borrowing and lending can be hedging of long-term 
capital movements by private non-banks. In this case, Japanese banks borrow funds in 
foreign currency to hedge foreign currency loans to Japanese investors. Japanese 
investors, in turn, require these loans to partly hedge their portfolios of foreign bonds 
(TakedalTurner (1992), p. 85). These activities are mirrored by the increase of net 
local foreign currency assets of Japanese banks which peaked in 1990 reaching nearly 
US$ 100 bn. (see Figure I I). Another reason for simultaneous foreign exchange 
borrowing and lending is maturity transformation, which was actively pursued by 
Japanese banks in this period (Turner (1991), p. 76). 
Figure 12 Accumulated Capital Flows 
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.. J.P. Morgan (1989), p. 3. See also Tak<daITumer (1992), pp. 84-85 and Nakao (1990), pp. 146147. 
- 59 -
The situation prevailing up to 1990 has much in common with the British 
position before World War I and the American position after World War II.  
Consequently, Japan is often referred to as a "world banker" borrowing short and 
lending long. However. one important characteristic of a world banker is missing. 
Since most of the lending and borrowing does not take place in Yen but in US dollars, 
Japanese banks have been active in maturity transformation but not in liquidity creation 
(Tavlas/Ozeki (1992» . In actively pursuing maturity transformation Japanese banks 
benefited from the difference between foreign long-term and short-term interest rates 
(Turner (1991), p. 76). When the yield curve in other countries (especially the United 
States) flattened, these activities were reduced (J.P.Morgan (1989), pp. 8-9). Figure 
12 shows how short-term liabilities of banks approximately matched bonds outflows and 
other long-term non-equity outflows. On the whole, banks accumulated a considerable 
amount of short-term foreign liabilities, which reached around US$ 250 bn. in 1988. 
lbis net position was nearly entirely due to foreign currency borrowing and lending.92 
It came close to accumulated net bonds purchases and long-term credits of around US$ 
300 bn. 
Figure 13 Accumulated Long-Term Capital Exports 
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Covered fx lending to residents, making a market in derivatives and maturity 
transformation in foreign currencies did not involve any large open fx positions of 
Japanese banks. Consequently, they did not play an important role in financing the 
large current account surpluses. So, the question arises how these surpluses were 
financed. Figure 13 displays the accumulated figures of official capital movements, 
direct investment and portfolio investment in equity. It is fairly safe to assume that 
direct investment and official capital movements are not hedged. Foreign investment 
in equity is probably hedged less than, for instance, investment in bonds (Davis (1991), 
p. 45). Under the assumption that these components of the capital account are hardly 
hedged, it can be concluded that up to 1989/90 the current account surpluses had their 
counterparts mainly in public capital movements and private equity flows. In 1989 the 
accumulated current account surplus stood at around US$ 400 bn. and direct 
investment, official capital movements and portfolio equity investments stood at around 
US$ 300 bn. So, in spite of the huge current account surpluses, which seem to indicate 
a high willingness to shoulder exchange rate risk, Japanese investors were not prepared 
to expose themselves to exchange rate risk to a larger extent. They either bought 
foreign instruments which are less exposed to exchange rate risk (equity) or they 
hedged a large part of their foreign currency investments. Finally, it has to be kept in 
mind that the public sector was a major capital exporter. 
On the whole, the analysis of the structure of Japanese capital outflows until 
1990 supports the hypothesis that the large net outflows can be nearly entirely attributed 
to foreign investment, involving direct investment, portfolio equity investment and 
(partly) hedged long-term credits and investments in bonds " Therefore, it can be 
concluded that currency speculation does not seem to have played a significant role in 
this period. 
In 1990 there was a marked change in short-term as well as in long-term capital 
flows. Within four years the composition of net foreign assets changed dramatically. 
At the same time, the current account surpluses reached new records, raising the 
accumulated surpluses from around US$ 400 bn. to over US$ 800 bn. within four 
years. This increase was nearly entirely due to short-term capital exports and purchases 
of foreign bonds. By 1994 accumulated official capital exports, direct investments, 
equity portfolio investments and "other" long-term capital exports amounted to less than 
fifty per cent of the accumulated current account surpluses (Figures 12 and 13). This 
decline of net long-term outflows was the result of smaller outflows of Japanese long-
93 It is often stated that the decline of the US dollar after its peak in the mid-1980s did not hurt 
Japanese investors because they had high unrealised capital gains due to price rises of Japanese land and 
stocks. If the analysis above is correct, the currency losses were smaller than is commoruy thought, 
because a considerable portion of foreign investments was hedged. 
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term capital and growing inflows of foreign long-term capital (Table 9). Short-term 
bank flows similarily underwent drastic changes. While the net short-term foreign 
currency position nearly remained constant, Japanese banks increased their foreign Yen 
assets and reduced their foreign Yen liabilities. The result was a reduction of the short­
term foreign liability position of US$ 250 bn., which steadily declined from 1990 
onwards reaching a net asset position of US$ 50 bn. in early 1994 (Figure I I).  
So, the period since 1990 is characterized by rising net capital outflows and a 
shift towards more exchange rate sensitive instruments. These outflows took place in 
a period in which the Yen experienced a strong real appreciation (Figure 14). The 
coincidence of these three factors seems to indicate that capital flows became more 
speculative. However, since most of the short-term outflows consisted of bank flows, 
such a conclusion may be premature. 
Figure 15 The Nominal Effective Exchange Rate of the Yen 
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The rapid decrease of the foreign liability position of banks cannot be easily 
explained. It has been argued that this shift was due to a change in the hedging 
technique. As investors shifted their hedging activities from the money markets to the 
derivatives markets, short-term capital inflows no longer seemed to be necessary to 
hedge long-term foreign assets (J.P.Morgan (1989), p. 8; Glick (1991), p. 30, fn. 27). 
- 62 -
However, this hypothesis is not convincing. Any net demand of JaPilnese investors for 
instruments suited to hedge foreign currency risk will trigger short-term capital inflows 
into Japan, no matter whether forward contracts, futures, swaps or options are used 
(see ch. 3 . 1 .2.). Therefore, a switch in the hedging technique cannot be responsible for 
the observed shift in the short-term capital account." 
Basically, the increase of short-term capital exports by banks could have been 
caused by four different factors (although these factors may also have been 
simultaneously at work). :  
a. Japanese investors increased their exposure to exchange rate" risk. 
b. Foreigners increasingly issued Yen denominated debt. 
c. Foreigners either decreased their Yen assets or increasingly hedged them. 
d. Market participants speculated on a depreciation of the Yen. 
a. The fact that Japanese long-term capital exports continued, albeit at a slower 
pace, while net short-term fx liabilities of Japanese banks remained more or less 
constant, suggests that hedging of foreign currency positions was reduced. Any new 
purchase of assets denominated in foreign currency must have been (on average) 
without hedging. Reduced hedging of Japanese investors can be due to the fact that they 
were prepared to bear more exchange rate risk. One possible explanation is that 
Japanese investors increased their foreign currency exposure speCUlating on a reversal 
of the marked appreciation of the Yen which took place in the early 1990s and which 
is still continuing. In addition, low returns in domestic markets may have' induced 
Japanese investors to continue investing in foreign bonds, in spite of a greater caution 
with respect to currency risk in the early 1990s (Bank of Japan (1993), pp. 15 and 34). 
Another reason for a reduction of hedging may have been that foreigners increasingly 
issued Yen denominated debt. 
b. The shift in the composition of capital flows may also be due to a marked 
increase of open Yen (short) positions of foreign borrowers who tried to profit from 
low interest rates in Japan." Low Yen interest rates and the hope that the Yen had 
reached its peak tempted many borrowers to issue·Yen debt." The outstanding stock 
94 On the other hand, the increased use of derivatives for hedging purposes can probably explain the 
reduction of the net local foreign currency position of Japanese banks (see Figure 12). 
" Such borrowing couId also be undertaken by subsidiaries of Japanese firms. See Bank of Japan 
(1993), p. 22. 
96 For example, in May 1995 the director of finance at the Italian treasury explained that Italy had 
laWlChed a large issue of Yen denominated eurobonds, because the combination of a recent decline of the 
Yen and low Yen interest rates had been "difficult to resist". See Lapper (1995). 
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of international Yen bonds rose from 1 3 1 .4 bn. in December 1989 to 28 1 . 8  bn. in 
March 1994." However, the statistics on international bond issues provide only 
information on the issuers of Yen bonds. Since debts can be swapped it remains unclear 
whether the issuer also remains the one who carries the exchange rate risk. Sweden 
provides a good example for this. In the early 1990s about 18 percent of Sweden's 
foreign currency debt was denominated in Yen. However, using swaps, Sweden 
reduced its Yen exposure to close to zero (Fontenay, Mi1esi-Ferretti and Pill (1995), 
p. 16). 
Table 9 Japan: Foreign Assets and Liabilities 
US-$ bn. 
For. L-T Ba S-T Liab. For. L-T Ba S-T Assets 
Liab. Liab. Fx Yen Assets Assets Fx Yen 
1983 235 103 -94 -14 272 1 7 1  64 9 
1984 267 1 13 -104 -26 341 229 65 13 
1985 308 122 -122 -39 438 301 80 22 
1986 547 192 -243 -79 727 476 131  64 
1987 83 1 236 -350 -181 1072 646 163 158 
1988 1 178 312 -501 -264 1469 833 260 242 
1989 1478 447 -576 -318 1771 1019 319 309 
1990 1530 464 -621 -278 1858 1096 361 284 
1991 1623 647 -555 -249 2007 1248 302 339 
1992 1522 658 -500 -185 2035 1316 263 337 
1993 1570 712 -468 -192 2181  1413 231 377 
1994 -448 -231 232 439 
:source: HanK or apan 
c .  Table 9 and Figure 1 1  show that the most important changes in short-term net 
assets of Japanese banks were due to changes of Yen denominated assets and liabilities. 
Yen assets rose from 1990 to 1994 and Yen liabilities declined from 1989 to 1992. 
Especially in 1992, Japanese banks drastically reduced their short-term Yen liabilities 
vis-�-vis foreign investors. The fact that Japanese banks increased their net short-term 
Yen assets in a period of rising long-term capital inflows suggests that foreigners 
hedged a considerable portion of their Yen investments. In 1990 foreigners held 305 
91 Source: Bank. for International Settlements. International Banking and Financial Market 
Development, various issues. 
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bn. worth of Japanese bonds (incl. gensaki transactions) and 182 bn. of credits to 
private non-banks. 1bese figures rose until 1993 to 374 bn. and 268 bn., respectively." 
It can be assumed that most of these Japanese liabilities were denominated in Yen. 
Therefore, an increased hedging of the stock of Japanese Yen liabilities held by 
foreigners as well as of new inflows could contribute to the explanation of the rapidly 
rising net short-term foreign Yen assets of Japanese banks. The rationale behind such 
behaviour could be that investors increasingly feared a reversal of the strong real 
appreciation of the Japanese Yen. In addition, the rising volume of short-term Yen 
loans to foreigners may also reflect the increasing activity of foreign institutional 
investors and investment banks in Japan. In order to actively pursue maturity 
transformation, interest rate speCUlation and arbitrage, these entities need short-term 
Yen loans." 
d. The increase of foreign Yen assets may also reflect fx speculation. To the extent 
that foreigners borrow Yen to speculate on a Yen depreciation, foreign short-term Yen 
assets of Japanese banks are increasing. Similarly, if speculators transact in derivatives 
markets, selling Yen short, foreign banks require Yen loans to hedge their open 
positions. Consequentely, in this case, Yen assets of Japanese banks are increased.11lO 
What is especially remarkable is not only the size of the outflow but also its 
persistence. Regardless of the continuing appreciation of the Yen, capital outflows 
increased in 1992 and 1993. So, despite the fact that expectations had been repeatedly 
wrong,lOI market participants did not start to speculate on a further appreciating Yen. 
In the first two cases (a. and b.) the persistent appreciation of the Yen must have 
produced considerable foreign exchange losses either for Japanese investors or for 
foreign borrowers."n In the third Case (c.) the loss consists of profits foregone, since 
foreign investors do not profit from the appreciation of the Yen. The first two 
possibilities bave in common that they imply that market participants had a strong view 
• IMF (b). own calculations . 
.. Compare also Bank of Japan (1993), pp. 9·13 and 31. 
!CD If, on the other hand, the specu1ators buy derivatives direclly from Japanese banks, the latter would 
be induced to increase their short-term fx assets. 
101 The Yen appreciation was much larger than predicted by the interest rate differential. 
1m Frequent reports in the press suggest that there are indeed many foreign debtors - many of them in 
Asia - which saw the cost of servicing their debts rise because of the continuing appreciation of the Yen. 
They include sovereign borrowers like the Republic of China (Yen debt: about USS 27 bo.) or Indonesia 
(Yen debt: about USS 40 bo.) and corporations like Thai Airways which has recendy recorded poor profits 
because offx losses on Yen denominated loans. See Murphy (1995), Bardacke (1995) and InternatiolUil 
Herald Tribune (1995). Many European countries have also issued Yen debt. However. it is not clear to 
what extent these debts have been swapped. 
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on the development of exchange rates and acted on it. In a period of marked 
appreciation of the Yen, Japanese investors considerably increased their holdings of 
non- Yen assets andlor foreign investors increased their Yen liabilities (either to hedge 
long Yen positions or to increase Yen short positions). Even though it cannot be 
decided whether such behaviour qualifies already as fx speculation, it can at least be 
said that both cases contain speculative elements. The third possibility has more in 
common with the behaviour of investors during the EMS crisis. Exchange rate 
uncertainty induced foreign investors to close some of the existing positions and to 
hedge to a large extent new investments in Japan. For the period as a whole, it is 
difficult to separate the other transactions from speculation. However, the volatile 
capital movements of 1994 allow for a better estimate. 
Figure 15 Japanese Capital Flows in 1993 and 1994 
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In 1994, investor sentiment became more uncertain and capital flows became 
more volatile. In early 1994 long-term capital flows (mainly bonds and portfolio equity) 
sharply turned. In the first quarter of 1994 there was a long-term capital inflow of over 
USS 50 bn. At the same time, there was a short-term outflow of US$ 80 bn. This was 
partly due to foreigners shifting funds from short-term assets to long-term assets. At 
the same time long-term capital outflows of Japanese investors ceased. Much of this 
seems to have been due to the uncertainty about US monetary policy and the attitude 
of the US administration which seemed to pursue a strategy of "talking down the 
dollar". Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising that the long-term capital 
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exports ceased and long-term capital imports increased. But what is surprising is that 
there was still a net capital outflow (in addition to the short-term outflow due to the 
shifting of funds by foreigners). As the increase in net local foreign currency liabilities 
of Japanese banks in the first quarter of 1994 shows, there were still Japanese investors 
prepared to go long in foreign currencylOO (a look at the currency composition of 
worldwide local foreign currency positions suggests that these bank liabilitie.s were 
mainly denominated in US-doUar) speculating against the trend of an appreciating Yen. 
This episode reinforces the assumption that large exchange rate moves may 
trigger stabilizing speculative capital movemenlS. However, it is by no means certain 
that such capital movements can always be relied upon. The change in sentiment of 
long-term investors in the first quarter of 1994 was neutralised by huge short-term 
outflows. However, whoever took a long dollar position or a short Yen position must 
have made considerable foreign exchange losses. If long-term investors should again 
prefer to leave their capital in Japan, short-term capital may be less willing to speculate 
on a depreciating Yen. In this case the initial effect would be another sharp and very 
large appreciation of the Yen. This could be witnessed in 1994 already when the Bank 
of Japan bought 27 bn. worth of foreign exchange (mostly dollars). In early 1995, the 
reductions of capital outflows, upward pressure on the Yen and interventions of the 
Bank of Japan accelerated. The doUar temporarily feU below 80 Yen and Bank of Japan 
interventions amounted to US$ 32 bn. in the first three months alone. 104 
So, for the second period, starting 1990, capital movements have not caused or 
reinforced the upward trend of the Yen. '" Quite the contrary, they have reduced the 
exchange rate movement because an increased outflow of capital is (c.p.) equal to an 
increase in the demand for foreign currency. Some of these outflows can be interpreted 
as evidence for the existence of stabilizing speculators of the McKinnon/Mayer type. 
In the main, however, hedging and intermediation seem to have been much more 
important. This shows that also under flexible exchange rates large short-term capital 
movements do not necessarily signal strong speculative forces. 
10) The flow of funds analysis of the Bank of Japan reveals that two groups ("Public Corporations and 
Local Governments" and ·Corporate Business") considerably increased their fx deposits with Japanese 
banks. See Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly. 
101 Between March 1993 and March 1995 foreign reserves increased by USS 85 bn. 
LOS This raises the question why the Yen appreciated in the first place. An important factor for the 
explanation of the Yen appreciation is the long recession in Japan which has freed capacity for ex.ports and 
held costs in check. The resulting increase in competitiveness of the tradable goods sector translated into 
a real appreciation. 
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S. Conclusions 
In this study it was attempted to estimate the amount of speculation in foreign 
exchange markets. Such an estimate is hard to make because it is theoretically as well 
as empirically difficult to delimitate speculation in relation to other activities. In 
particular, the distinction between speculation and hedging is highly problematic. On 
the one hand, there are types of hedging which are clearly meant to reduce exchange 
rate risk; on the other hand, a strategy of variable hedging has to be interpreted as 
speculation. Similarly, open fx positions may be held mainly in order to profit from 
expected exchange rate changes or because a portfolio of local and unhedged foreign 
assets offers better risk-return characteristics than a portfolio which includes hedged 
foreign assets. The present study cannot offer an exact way to estimate speculative 
activity in fx markets. It highlights the difficulties of making such an estimate and 
shows how not to estimate speculation. Thus, it helps to obtain a more realistic view 
of the possible amounts of speculation. 
Figures like the turnover in fx markets, the volume of short-term capital 
movements or the amount of capital flows during currency crises are not useful as 
estimates of speculative activity in foreign exchange markets. Rather, an estimate of 
specUlative activity should use net capital flows as a starting point, because these flows 
provide information about the willingness to hold open positions. By including 
information about the structure of capital flows and the size and structure of stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities, the potential size of non-speculative transactions can be 
estimated. The structure of capital flows provides information about the size of those 
capital flows which are not particularly exposed to exchange rates and which therefore 
cannot reflect currency speculation. Furthermore, co-movements of long-term and 
short-term capital flows can be used as an indicator of hedging. In addition, the size and 
the structure of foreign assets and liabilities can provide information about the possible 
amount of hedging. Finally, banking flows should be regarded as nearly fully hedged, 
that is, a net banking flow in one direction either mirrors another flow in the opposite 
direction or a derivatives transaction with a third party. 
Based on these findings, an analysis of capital flows between Spain and the rest 
of the world shows that a larger part than earlier believed of the capital outflows during 
the EMS crisis may have been due to hedging. As the analysis of foreign currency 
positions shows, fx liabilities of Spanish residents and Pta. assets of foreigners were . 
much larger than net capital outflows (which were approximately equal to reserve 
losses). Furthermore, it can be inferred that the large capital flows after the crisis did 
not involve any open fx positions at all. Foreigners were simply betting on interest rate 
changes, avoiding any exchange rate risk. The same could also be observed in Germany 
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after the crisis. The case of Japan is more difficult to interpret. After a number of years 
characterised by outflows of direct investment, portfolio equity and partly hedged bonds 
investment (Plus high official capital exports), the early 1990s saw high exports in 
instruments which were exposed to exchange rate risk. The exposure to exchange rate 
risk was increased. This may have partly been due to the strong real appreciation which 
seems to have induced investors and debtors to speculate on a subsequent depreciation 
of the Yen. 
What are the implications for economic policy? For one thing, this study may 
help to evaluate the size of official reserves and the effectiveness of measures, such as 
the Tobin-tax, which are meant to reduce exchange rate volatility. Some economists 
have recently compared official reserves to the turnover in foreign exchange markets 
and found that reserves were small indeed. However, the comparison of a stock of 
assets with a turnover figure is hardly meaningful. Whether the same amount of one 
million Pta. is traded only once in fx markets (turnover: one million) or ten times 
(turnover: ten million) does not make any difference; it is still one million and it can 
only buy one million worth of foreign exchange.'" Imports, exports or the current 
account also do not provide a meaningful yardstick. This may have been different in 
times of fixed exchange rates and restricted capital mobility. Under these conditions, 
reserves must be high enough in order to finance potential future trade deficits. 
However, nowadays reserves have to be compared to potential capital outflows in times 
of crisis. Potential outflows are a function of 
- local currency assets held by foreigners, 
- foreign currency debt of residents, 
- the potential amount of speculation and 
- the ability of the government (or the central bank) to borrow in international markets. 
If the results of this study are correct, the most important items in the list are 
usually the first two: the stock of open fx positions of foreigners and residents. If these 
stocks have been accumulating over many years, any crisis of confidence may trigger 
large outflows due to hedging, the size of which may by far be more important than the 
potential amount of speculation. 
If such stock adjustments were indeed the prime source for the large capital 
flows during the EMS crisis or the Peso crisis, then exchange rates can only be kept 
stable when net foreign asset positions are small. If these conditions are not fulfilled, 
IC¥ Similarly, a high turoover on the stock exchange provides no information about the ability of market 
participants to finance the purchase of new stocks and a high turnover in the money market compared to 
the monetary base does not mean that central banks cannot influence short-term interest rates or price 
levels. 
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a Tobin-tax would not help very much to preserve exchange rate stability. Such a tax 
would only make hedging more expensive. However, in times of crisis this would 
hardly deter anyone from closing open positions.I07 Interestingly enough, the only 
stabilising influence of the Tobin-tax, which was meant to reduce short-term speculation 
without hurting long-term flows, may come from its adverse effect on long-term capital 
flows. By making short-term capital movements more expensive, the Tobin-tax would 
increase the costs of hedging and make international money and derivatives markets less 
liquid. This reduces the expected return on foreign long-term investment and increases 
its risks.IOO Therefore, long-term investment would be negatively affected by a Tobin­
tax, so that stocks of net foreign assets are likely to be smaller than in a world without 
the Tobin-tax. 
107 Similarly. it has been argued that such a tax would hardly deter speculators. See Garberrraylor 
(1995), Kene. (1995) and Schrader (1995). 
101 This applies to portfolio investment and long-term credits - not to direct investment. 
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Appendix 
Interest Rate Differentials, Exchange Rate Changes, Bond- and Equity Price Changes 
1993 JaD Feb Mar Apr May JUD 
DM/$ 2.28 1.6 0,35 ·3.12 0.63 2.28 
p .•. 27.36 19.2 4.2 .37.44 7.56 34.56 
Euro- 3.12 3.05 3.1 3.06 3.04 3.11 
S 
Fibor 8.7 8.61 8.39 8.15 7.72 7.79 
Dilf. 5.58 ,.,. 5.29 5.09 4.68 4.68 
Bo..ts 103.3 104.3 105.8 105.4 104.6 104.3 
p.m. 1.18 0.97 1.44 .0.38 .0.76 .0.29 
p .•. 14.16 1 l .64 17,28 -4.56 ·9, 12 ·3.48 
� 268.4 283·6 293.4 289.7 283.3 288,6 
p.m. 2.8 5."" 3.46- .1. 26 ·2.21 1:87 
p .• 33.6 67.92 41.52 ·15.12 26.52 2.2.44 
Euro-$; one month Euro-S interest rate 
FIBOR: one month Franfurt Interbank Offered Rate 
Equ.: German Stoclanarket Index, 1980� 100 
Bonds: Average Price of various 8% bo:nds 
p.m.: change in % per month 
Jul 
3.78 
45.36 
3.11  
7.14 
4.23 
105.1 
0.77 
9,24 
303.6 
5.2 
62,4 
interest rates: one month Euro-$ and OQe month German FIBOR 
Au. Sop 
·I. l l  4.31 
·13.32 ·51.72 
3.05 3.06 
6.81 6.85 
3.76 3.79 
106.2 107 
1.05 0.75 
12.6 9 
320.8 322.2 
5.67 0,44 
68.04 5.28 
p.a.: change " per year (arithmetically derived from the monthly changes) 
Source: 
O<t 
0.95 
11.4 
),08 
675 
3.67 
107.7 
0.65 
7.8 
338.9 
S.18 
62.16 
Deu�che Bundesbank, Statistische Beihefte zum Monatsbericht, Zahlungsbilanzstatistik; 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistische Beihefte zum Monatsbericht, Kapitalmarktstatistik. 
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Nov De< 
3.79 0.57 
45.48 6.84 
3.13 3.27 
6·43 6.37 
3·3 3. 1 
108.3 IOS.6 
0.56 0.28 
6.72 3.36 
:146.9 361.7 
2.36 4.27 
28.32 51 .24 
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